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ABSTRACT
The federal tax code includes numerous provisions disallowing or
curtailing income tax deductions related to such disparate activities
as business lobbying and providing non-performance-based compen-
sation to senior corporate executives. The primary claim of this
Article is that a tendency to mentally frame business deductions as
subsidies, often reinforced by rhetoric explicitly framing deductions
as subsidies, helps explain these provisions. The traditional "public
policy" disallowances directed at lobbying, fines and penalties paid
by businesses, and antitrust treble damages respond to an appear-
ance of a taxpayer subsidy that would follow from deduction, despite
the fact that it is far from clear that these deductions, if allowed,
would create an exception to taxation of net income. Disallowances
directed at executive pay and other corporate governance matters also
take advantage of an appearance of subsidy. In these cases, structur-
ing an economic disincentive as a disallowed deduction (versus
economically equivalent direct regulation) and explicitly framing the
intervention as the elimination or curtailment of a subsidy create an
illusion of lesser regulatory intervention that helps overcome
opposition to the legislation. The normative implications of mental
and rhetorical framing of deduction as subsidy are troubling. It is
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becoming increasing clear that disallowed deductions generally are
a poor means of implementing economic policy, and the power of
subsidy framing and rhetoric provides another reason to be skeptical
ofcorporate governance and similar business regulation incorporated
in the tax code.
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INTRODUCTION
The federal tax code includes numerous provisions that discour-
age particular nontax behaviors. "Sin taxes" and other excise taxes
do so, of course, but often disincentives take the form of curtailed or
disallowed business tax deductions. Consider Internal Revenue
Code (Code) section 162(f), which disallows deductions for fines or
penalties paid to the government for violations of law,' or
section 162(m), which limits the corporate tax deduction for non-
performance-based compensation paid to certain senior executives.'
The effect of both provisions is to raise the effective cost of-and to
discourage-disfavored activity.
This Article asks why these disallowance provisions, which have
been described as negative tax expenditures3 or tax penalties,4
appear in the Code. In the case of section 162(m) and other cor-
porate governance-directed disallowances, the question is why tax
instead of direct nontax regulation. In the case of section 162(f) and
the other traditional "public policy" disallowances, the question is
why there is any federal intervention at all. The primary claim of
this Article is that a tendency to mentally frame business deduc-
tions as subsidies, often reinforced by rhetoric explicitly framing
deductions as subsidies, helps to explain why one observes these
disallowance provisions.
Public Policy Disallowances. This Article argues that the dis-
allowance on "public policy" grounds of deductions for fines and
penalties paid,' bribery,' a portion of antitrust treble damages,' and
1. I.R.C. § 162(f) (2006).
2. Id. § 162(m).
3. For an explanation of tax expenditures, see STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX
REFORM: THE CONCEPT OFTAX EXPENDITURES 336 n.61 (1973) [hereinafter SURREY, PATHWAYS
TO TAX REFORM]; STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 28-30 (1985);
Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A
Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705 (1970) [hereinafter
Surrey, Tax Incentives].
4. See Eric M. Zolt, Deterrence via Taxation: A Critical Analysis of Tax Penalty
Provisions, 37 UCLA L. REV. 343, 344 (1989).
5. I.R.C. § 162(f).
6. Id. § 162(c).
7. Id. § 162(g).
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lobbying and political activities' is best understood as a response to
an appearance of subsidy. Some legislators may honestly believe
that the .underlying deductions unfairly subsidize objectionable
behavior and undermine public policy.' Others may favor disallow-
ance as a means of mitigating public outrage that would follow from
the appearance of subsidy if the deductions were allowed.' 0 Still
other legislators might harness, or even create, this outrage in order
to advance their political prospects."
But are the underlying deductions subsidies? That depends on
one's baseline. In a tax system directed at net income, some
deductions properly define net income and are not subsidies,
whereas other deductions represent exceptions to the tax on net
income and constitute subsidies." In order to distinguish between
the two groups, however, one would need a normative net income
baseline, and Congress has provided no such baseline." Moreover,
even when theorists agree on a normative theory for defining the
baseline, such as the Haig-Simons definition of income,' 4 they do not
always agree on the proper classification of particular deductions."
The result of this ambiguity is not random classification of deduc-
tions as subsidy or nonsubsidy. There appears to be a tendency to
equate deduction-at least business deduction-with subsidy."
There are several possible explanations for this phenomenon. First,
the pre-deduction situation may be the instinctive mental baseline.
In part, the use of the term "deduction" in other contexts to signify
a discount may be imported into our thinking about tax." Second,
in some cases, observers may fail to consider the entire transaction,
ignoring the fact that gains are taxable, which suggests that costs
are appropriately deducted.'" Third, and more perniciously, this
8. Id. § 162(e).
9. See infra Part III.B.
10. See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
11. See infra note 198.
12. See infra notes 83-91 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
14. See infra note 88 and accompanying text.
15. See infra Part IIA.2.
16. See infra Part II.A.2.
17. See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
18. See infra Part IIIA.1.a.i.
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Article will suggest that political rhetoric that frames deductions as
subsidies may shape popular perception.e
As a policy matter, nothing should turn on uncertain "subsidy"
labels, but the appearance of subsidy has long figured into public
policy disallowances. Tax administrators initially sought these dis-
allowances, and the courts sustained them.20 Determining whether
the allowance of a deduction for fines, penalties, or damages actu-
ally undermines public policy requires an inquiry into the processes
by which the sanction was set. The courts were ill-equipped to con-
duct this inquiry, and disallowance seems to have followed from an
intuitive but often questionable syllogism: (1) deduction equals
subsidy; (2) subsidization of proscribed behavior undermines public
policy; therefore, (3) deduction undermines public policy.2 '
As reactive responses to an appearance of subsidy that is inherent
in a tax scheme directed at net income, these interventions likely
would vanish if the corporate income tax were to vanish. Although
section 162(f) increases the cost of violations of law and provides
revenue for the United States Treasury,2 2 it is unlikely that the
provision would be replaced by a direct exaction levied on fines or
penalties paid if the corporate income tax were repealed and not
replaced with some other tax scheme levied on net corporate income.
Corporate Governance Disallowances. Section 162(m) and the
other corporate governance disallowance provisions are different in
this regard.23 Section 162(m) was not a direct response to an appear-
ance of subsidy but was a response to public outrage and a demand
for action regarding executive pay generally." This Article argues
that the appearance of subsidy likely played a key role in the choice
to structure the federal intervention as a disallowance instead of as
direct regulation. But direct regulation was certainly a conceivable
19. See infra Part II.B.
20. See, e.g., Rugel v. Comm'r, 127 F.2d 393, 395 (8th Cir. 1942) (disallowing deduction
for payments to "purchase ... political influence"); Great N. Ry. Co. v. Comm'r, 40 F.2d 372,
373 (8th Cir. 1930) (disallowing deduction for penalty payments).
21. See infra Part III.A.1.b.
22. See I.R.C. § 162(f) (2006).
23. Id. § 162(m).
24. See infra notes 103-04, 195 and accompanying text.
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alternative and, absent a corporate income tax, direct regulation
might have been enacted.2 5
Of course, there is no inherent economic difference between direct
regulation and tax disincentive, but even where substantively
identical, form matters," Given the propensity to conceptualize
business deductions as subsidies, structuring a disincentive as a tax
disallowance creates an illusion that is similar to the fiscal illusion
created by tax subsidies.2 7 It is well understood that the difference
between tax subsidies and direct spending is illusory." The gov-
ernment can influence the allocation and distribution of societal
resources through either avenue, but the use of a tax subsidy in-
stead of direct spending creates an illusion of smaller government
from a fiscal perspective because the tax subsidy appears to reduce
taxes and spending.2 9 Although an illusion, the appearance affects
reception and helps to explain the popularity of various tax pro-
grams.ao
Now consider tax disincentives and direct penalties that have the
same allocational and distributional properties. Tax disincentives,
such as section 162(m), suffer relative to direct penalties in terms
of fiscal illusion because they appear to increase taxes and provide
no direct revenue.3 1 But to the extent that a tax disincentive taking
the form of a disallowed deduction is viewed as simply eliminating
a tax subsidy, it creates an illusion of lesser regulatory interference.
This Article will refer to this effect as "regulatory illusion."3 2
The regulatory illusion created by disallowed deductions such as
section 162(m) is reinforced by political rhetoric that labels the
underlying deduction a subsidy, whether the deduction is or is not
25. See infra Part III.B.3.
26. See infra Part III.B.3.
27. See infra Part III.B.3.
28. See David F. Bradford, Tax Expenditures and the Problem of Accounting for
Government, in TAX EXPENDITURES AND GOVERNMENT POLICY 427,428 (Neil Bruce ed., 1988);
Daniel N. Shaviro, Rethinking Tax Expenditures and Fiscal Language, 57 TAX L. REV. 187,
191 (2004) (noting that the distinction "depends on pure form").
29. See Bradford, supra note 28, at 429; Shaviro, supra note 28, at 189; Eric J. Toder, Tax
Cuts or Spending-Does It Make a Difference?, 53 NAT'L TAX J. 361 (2000); see also infra Part
III.B.3.
30. See infra note 222 and accompanying text.
31. I.R.C. § 162(m) (2006); see infra Part III.B.3.
32. See infra Part III.B.3.
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an actual subsidy." The inherent ambiguity in the character of
income tax deductions allows virtually all deductions to be plausibly
framed as subsidies and disallowances to be framed as subsidy
curtailment or elimination.34 It is much more difficult to plausibly
frame direct penalties as subsidy curtailment.3 5 This structural or
rhetorical maneuver should be important when the subject is
economic regulation that might be resisted by free-market-oriented
legislators or constituents. Thus, just as fiscal illusion helps to
explain the popularity of tax subsidies, regulatory illusion can help
to explain disallowances directed at corporate governance and
similar matters."
To test the impact of disincentive structure and framing on public
perception, I conducted a student survey, the results of which are
reported herein." Several hundred law students were asked to rate
the degree to which they would support hypothetical regulation of
"excessive" executive pensions. Consistent with the suggestions
above, the students were less inclined to support direct penalties on
excess pensions than they were to support the elimination of a
deduction, although the two interventions were structured to be
economically equivalent.' Moreover, support for deduction curtail-
ment was greater when the disallowance was explicitly framed as
the elimination of a subsidy than when the change was presented
in neutral language without any mention of subsidization."
Of course, regulatory illusion is only useful when there is an
underlying deduction related to the disfavored activity that may be
curtailed. By contrast, the enactment of an excise tax would not
create an appearance of subsidy elimination and would not benefit
from regulatory illusion. Also, this Article does not claim that
subsidy confusion and regulatory illusion fully explain the existence
33. Recall that a business deduction represents a tax subsidy when it creates an exception
to the tax on net income. Although straightforward conceptually, it will not always be clear
whether a particular deduction is better thought of as subsidy or normatively correct
adjustment to net income. See infra Part II.A.2.
34. See infra Part II.A.2.
35. See infra notes 212-16 and accompanying text.
36. See infra Part III.B.3.
37. See infra Part II.C; see also infra Appendix.
38. See infra Part II.C; see also infra Appendix.
39. See infra Part II.C; see also infra Appendix.
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of all disallowance provisions directed at nontax behavior. Several
commentators have remarked upon the administrative advantages
of using the Code to regulate corporate governance and similar
behavior.40 These observations are not in conflict with this Article's
argument. The key point here is that given the tendency of observ-
ers to broadly conceptualize business deductions as subsidies and
the ease with which disallowance can be plausibly framed as
subsidy curtailment, one should expect to see more public policy
disallowances in the Code and more frequent resort to the Code as
the venue of choice for governance and similar regulation than one
otherwise would.
From a normative perspective, purposeful exploitation of mental
framing of deduction as subsidy and overbroad rhetoric equating
deduction to subsidy are troubling.41 Although rhetoric can be fought
with rhetoric, to some extent framing effects may be unavoidable.
As noted above, regulation structured as the disallowance of a
subsidy is viewed differently than direct regulation, even when no
overt reference is made to subsidies.42 It is becoming increasingly
clear, however, that disallowed deductions are generally poor means
of implementing economic policy, despite some administrative
advantages.4 3 Recognizing the power of subsidy framing provides yet
another reason to be skeptical of business regulation incorporated
in the Code.
This Article is organized as follows. Part I provides an overview
of disallowance provisions aimed at business behavior. Part II
argues that business deductions tend to be conceptualized, or men-
tally framed, as subsidies and that this tendency may be reinforced
by rhetoric explicitly equating deduction with subsidy. The conse-
quences of mental and rhetorical framing for judicial and legislative
processes are discussed in Part III. Part IV outlines the implications
of mental and rhetorical framing and is followed by a brief conclu-
sion.
40. See, e.g., David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending
Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 958 (2004).
41. See infra Part IV.
42. See supra notes 28-39 and accompanying text.
43. See infra Part III.B.3.a.
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I. OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND ON DISALLOWED DEDUCTIONS
This Article is concerned with disallowance provisions that are
directed at nontax business behavior, ranging from political activ-
ities to executive compensation. The disallowances raise the
effective cost of such behaviors relative to the alternative of allowing
the otherwise ordinary and necessary business expense deduc-
tions.4 4 As a result, these provisions often have been labeled tax
penalties4 s or negative tax expenditures.46 Reflecting the ambiguity
that is discussed in Part II.A.2, this Article will refer to these
provisions simply as "disallowances."
This Part provides a brief overview of such disallowances. It
provides examples, reviews the academic literature as it relates to
disallowance, and briefly considers and contrasts substantively
identical, nontax regulation.
A. Examples of Disallowances
A number of disallowance provisions are directed at corporate
governance or other corporate behavior. Section 162(m) is one
example.4 7 Corporations normally are permitted to deduct the cost
of employee compensation."8 Section 162(m), however, disallows the
deduction for non-performance-based pay provided to certain senior
executives that exceeds $1 million annually.4 9 For example, former
Bank of America CEO Kenneth Lewis received a salary of $1.5
million for 2008.o Salary is not performance-based pay. Given
section 162(m), Bank of America would have been permitted to
deduct from its taxable income only $1 million of that amount; the
remaining $500,000 would have been a nondeductible expense."
44. Excise taxes also raise the effective cost of nontax behavior but do not share the
ambiguity of disallowances.
45. Zolt, supra note 4, at 344.
46. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
47. I.R.C. § 162(m) (2006).
48. Id. § 162(a)(1).
49. Id. § 162(m).
50. See Executive Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2009, at BU10.
51. The $1 million limitation applies to all compensation received by the executive within
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Similarly, sections 280G and 162(k) disallow corporate tax
deductions for certain excessive "golden parachute" severance
payments made to executives and for "greenmail" payments made
to corporate raiders, respectively.5 2 Section 901(j) disallows credits
for taxes paid to foreign countries that the United States does not
recognize, with which the United States has severed diplomatic
relations, or that have been designated as supporting international
terrorism."
Moreover, during recent years, legislators have introduced num-
erous bills in Congress that would have disallowed deductions
arising from various disfavored business practices. For example, in
2009, Senators Carl Levin and John McCain introduced the Ending
Excessive Corporate Deductions for Stock Options Act, which would
have limited corporate tax deductions for stock option compensation
to the amount recognized as an expense in financial statements.5 4
In the 109th Congress alone, at least fifteen bills were introduced
that would have disallowed tax deductions in this manner.
Other disallowance provisions have a much longer pedigree.
Many were first created by courts that disallowed certain deductions
on "public policy" grounds.5 6 Subsequently, Congress codified many
of these provisions. Examples include disallowance of deductions for
the payment of fines and penalties,"5 bribes and kickbacks,"5 and
certain lobbying and political activities.5 ' Along the same lines,
Congress has disallowed deductions for the punitive portion of
the year. I.R.C. § 162(m). To simplify exposition, this calculation assumes that all other
compensation received by Lewis qualified as performance-based.
52. Id. §§ 280G, 162(k). In these cases, Congress also subjects the receipts of these
payments to excise taxes. See id. §§ 4999, 5881.
53. Id. § 901(j). Until 1993 this provision was also used to disallow tax credits for
companies doing business in South Africa. See South African Democratic Transition Support
Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-149, § 4(b)(8), 107 Stat. 1503, 1505 (codified as amended at I.R.C.
§ 901(j)).
54. S. 1491, 111th Cong. (2009).
55. For example, House Bill 575, the Say. No to Drug Ads Act, would have disallowed
deductions for certain prescription drug advertisements. H.R. 575, 109th Cong. (2005).
56. See Comm'r v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 473-74 (1943) (discussing judicial
disallowance).
57. I.R.C. § 162(f) (2006).
58. Id. § 162(c).
59. Id. § 162(e).
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antitrust treble damages,'o net gambling losses,"1 and expenses
incurred in the sale of illegal drugs.6 2 Congress has also limited
depreciation deductions with respect to luxury automobiles."
B. The Literature on Disallowances
Although not featured as prominently as tax subsidies, disallow-
ances have been discussed in the academic literature. In his 1973
book Pathways to Tax Reform: The Concept of Tax Expenditures,
Stanley Surrey listed seven Code provisions that he labeled
disincentives, including denials of deductions for the following:
lobbying and political contributions, payments of fines and penal-
ties, bribes and kickbacks, payment of treble damages in antitrust
cases, and net gambling losses." Surrey speculated that the reason
there were not more tax penalties was that Congress was "wary of
mixing morals and enforcement against nontax pursuits" into the
Code." The reticence seems to have diminished of late.
In a 1989 article, Eric Zolt applied the Surrey critique of tax
subsidies in analyzing disallowances or tax penalties." Zolt found
tax penalties lacking. He concluded that they were "remarkably
crude policy instruments" and difficult to defend on economic
grounds." Updated for current tax rates, Zolt's chief criticisms were
as follows: First, the denial of a deduction, the classic tax penalty,
has the effect of imposing a 35 percent penalty on an offending
individual or corporation paying tax at the highest marginal rate,
but the penalty has lesser or even no effect on corporate taxpayers
with large accumulated losses or on individual taxpayers in lower
60. Id. § 162(g).
61. Id. § 165(d).
62. Id. § 280E.
63. Id. § 280F.
64. See SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM, supra note 3, at 336-37. With the exception
of the limitation on deductibility of gambling losses, each of these disallowances is directed
at business activity, in the sense that only businesses would be entitled to the underlying
deductions absent the disallowance provisions.
65. Id. at 337.
66. See generally Zolt, supra note 4. Zolt defined tax penalties more narrowly than I have.
He "focuse(d] only on those provisions for which Congress' motive is to penalize illegal or
undesirable nontax activities." Id. at 348.
67. Id. at 344-45.
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tax brackets.' Thus, two taxpayers may face widely different
penalties for engaging in the same disfavored behavior. Second, the
denial of a deduction is a one-size-fits-all-offenses penalty. For a
corporation paying tax at the highest marginal rate, the tax penalty
for paying executive salaries in excess of $1 million or for lobbying
federal officials is exactly the same-35 percent of the money spent.
It seems unlikely that a 35 percent penalty provides optimal
deterrence for such disparate activities. It is fair to say that these
provisions are remarkably crude deterrents.
However, the crudeness of tax penalties should not lead to
automatic condemnation. Zolt also noted that tax penalties entail
low administrative costs and that these provisions may serve a sym-
bolic function." To some degree, these benefits offset the crudeness
of the incentives provided. This view is reinforced in more recent
work by David Weisbach and Jacob Nussim, who argue that
institutional considerations, such as administrative costs, special-
ization, and coordination, should determine whether federal pro-
grams are implemented via the tax code or through other avenues."
Aside from discussion of possible administrative or coordination
benefits, there has been little consideration of why disincentives
directed at nontax behavior appear in the Code at all.
C. Tax-Like Disincentives Outside the Tax Code
It was not inevitable that these disincentives would be incor-
porated within the tax code. One observes very similar tax-like
disincentives in other regulatory schemes. Consider, for example,
the federal Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency (CAFE) standards.7 2
Vehicle manufacturers that fail to meet the required sales-weighted
average fuel economy standard for any model year are fined five
dollars per vehicle for every tenth of a mile per gallon by which their
68. See id.
69. See id. at 345.
70. See id. Symbolic legislation addresses legislators' political need to appear to act rather
than, or in addition to, instrumental objectives. See infra note 189 and accompanying text.
71. See Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 40, at 958-59.
72. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 32901-32919 (2006).
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fleet falls short of the standard." This is clearly a tax in an eco-
nomic sense: it is a Pigouvian tax levied on an activity that gener-
ates negative externalities." The disincentives created by the CAFE
standards and fines are analogous to those created by the limit
placed on the deduction for senior executive non-performance-based
pay under section 162(m)." Note, however, that in the case of the
CAFE standards, there was no closely associated tax deduction or
credit that could have been curtailed. As a result, it was necessary
to enact an excise tax to create the desired disincentive.
II. MENTAL AND RHETORICAL FRAMING OF DEDUCTION AS SUBSIDY
From an economic standpoint, the disallowance of a tax deduction
may be indistinguishable from a direct penalty, such as that im-
posed under the CAFE regime.7 6 But to observers, these forms of
regulation appear to be different. Unlike direct penalties, the dis-
allowance of a business tax deduction tends to be conceptualized as
the elimination of a taxpayer subsidy. The inherent tendency to
conceptualize deduction as subsidy, which this Article refers to as
"mental framing," may be reinforced by rhetoric explicitly framing
deductions as subsidies and disallowance as subsidy curtailment."
73. See id. § 32912.
74. See ARTHUR CECIL PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 192-95 (Transaction
Publishers 2002) (1952); see also William J. Baumol, On Taxation and the Control of
Externalities, 62 AM. EcoN. REv. 307, 307-08 (1972).
75. See I.R.C. § 162(m) (2006).
76. This is not to say that disallowances and direct sanctions always are viewed as
equivalent from the point of view of the regulated party, even when economically equivalent.
Some penalty regimes carry independent normative weight beyond the explicit sanction. In
other words, a company may be more likely to suffer a tax disallowance than to commit an act
deemed illegal, even if the economic sanctions are equivalent.
77. The term "framing effect" often is used to refer to the phenomenon in which reception
of a proposal differs depending on how the proposal is described. See, e.g., James N.
Druckman & Kjersten R. Nelson, Framing and Deliberation: How Citizens' Conversations
Limit Elite Influence, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 729, 730 (2004). For example, many observers believe
that estate tax repeal advocates shifted public opinion against the tax by relentlessly applying
the label "death tax." See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND
CUTS: THE FIGHT OVER TAXING INHERITED WEALTH 124-25 (2005) (noting the widespread
perception, but also noting that some observers believe the rhetoric had less impact on public
opinion than is generally claimed). This Article will refer to this phenomenon as "rhetorical
framing." But rhetoric aside, in considering any complex question, certainly any tax question,
observers start with a mental baseline. These baselines or frames are not necessarily
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The rhetoric is effective because it is plausible. It is plausible
because although some business deductions almost surely do not
constitute subsidies, there is no authoritative baseline and a wide
range of ambiguity.
A. Mental Framing
1. Choice of Baseline-In General
The characterization of a deduction as a subsidy and disallowance
as subsidy curtailment is economically irrelevant, but the perception
matters. Characterization of a transfer as a subsidy simply reflects
a choice of baseline. The instinctive baseline for thinking about a
direct penalty, such as the CAFE penalties, is the pre-penalty
situation. The imposition of a direct penalty makes the regulated
party worse off relative to that baseline. Eliminating the penalty
would make the regulated party better-off, but as a move back in
the direction of the pre-penalty situation, elimination would not
typically be characterized as granting a subsidy, but as removing
the penalty."
Despite the fact that the U.S. income tax system is based on net,
not gross, income, I believe that in thinking about any particular
business deduction, observers tend to adopt a pre-deduction, gross
income baseline. Given that baseline, these deductions appear to be
pro-taxpayer deviations that observers tend to conceptualize as
subsidies. This is not surprising. Outside of the tax context, to
"deduct" means to reduce, subtract, or discount from some base-
line." The elimination of a deduction is a move back in the direction
consistent. Observers may apply a different mental baseline to economically equivalent, but
technically different, regulatory interventions. This Article will refer to this choice of baseline
as "mental framing."
78. Seth Kreimer has suggested that history is a plausible baseline for distinguishing
between penalties and nonsubsidies. See Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The
Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1293, 1359-63 (1984). I do
not think, however, that a direct penalty has to be new for this effect to hold. In other words,
I do not think that direct penalties are characterized as penalties because of reliance on a pre-
penalty status quo. The fact that a direct penalty is long-established does not tend to affect
our conceptual baseline.
79. See, e.g., THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 369 (4th ed. 2007); ROGET'S
INTERNATIONAL THESAURUS 252.07, 255.09, 631.02 (6th ed. 2001).
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of the gross income baseline, so observers tend to conceptualize that
move as the elimination of a subsidy."o
This is not the only way to frame a deduction. In Commissioner
v. Sullivan, discussed below, the Supreme Court adopted a different
baseline, which resulted in a different characterization." However,
this Article argues that the general tendency is to select a baseline
that results in business deductions being characterized as subsidies.
2. Inherent Ambiguity
The tendency to characterize business deductions as subsidies is
facilitated by the inherent ambiguity of deductions in a tax scheme
based on net income that lacks a clear baseline. The ambiguity of
tax deductions and their disallowance can be traced back to the
Sixteenth Amendment, which clarifies the power of Congress to tax
incomes, but fails to define the term. The Amendment simply pro-
vides that "[tihe Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes
on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment
among the several States, and without regard to any census or
enumeration." Commentators generally agree that the aim of the
Sixteenth Amendment was to confirm Congress's power to tax net
income," but the Amendment simply refers to "incomes,"84 leaving
open the possibility that a nonapportioned tax on gross income
would be constitutional. This is an open question." In any event,
80. Some nonbusiness deductions, such as the personal income tax deduction for home
mortgage interest payments, may not be conceptualized by the average observer as a subsidy.
However, nonsubsidy characterization of personal deductions, where it exists, may be a
function of settled expectations rather than an economic intuition regarding the nature of the
deduction. In any event, the focus of this Article is on business deductions, and in that context
the tendency to conceptualize as subsidy appears to be pervasive.
81. 356 U.S. 27 (1958); see also infra notes 145-52 and accompanying text.
82. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
83. See, e.g., ERIK M. JENSEN, THE TAXING POWER: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION 118 (2005).
84. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
85. The open question is whether basis recovery is constitutionally protected. See Joseph
M. Dodge, The Constitutionality of Federal Taxes and Federal Tax Provisions 20 (Fla. State
Univ. Coll. of Law, Pub. Law Research Paper No. 226, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=943014 (arguing the minority position that basis recovery is not constitutionally
protected and that for purposes of the Sixteenth Amendment "income" equals "gross income").
No one seriously argues that specific deductions for business expenses are constitutionally
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perhaps as a result of this uncertainty, combined with a recognition
that some deductions are needed to properly define the tax base,
courts have long provided Congress with extremely broad discretion
to create, revoke, or condition deductions from gross income.
Deductions, it is often said, are a matter of "legislative grace."" Or,
as the Supreme Court stated in Helvering v. Independent Life
Insurance Co., "Unquestionably Congress has power to condition,
limit or deny deductions from gross income in order to arrive at the
net that it chooses to tax.""
One consequence of this state of affairs is that at one level
deductions are inherently ambiguous. If gross income constituted
the income tax baseline, all deductions allowed by Congress would
represent subsidies. If the currently enacted Code constituted the
baseline, no deduction would be a subsidy. A more reasonable view,
however, is that Congress has enacted a tax on net income, that
some deductions allowed by Congress define net income, and that
others represent exceptions to the tax on net income, and thus are
subsidies. Unfortunately, deductions do not come with handy labels,
and individual members of Congress are as unlikely to agree on the
appropriate characterization of particular deductions as are judges
or commentators.
Adoption of a normative conception of net income does not fully
resolve the ambiguity. The Haig-Simons definition of income-the
sum of personal consumption and the change in wealth across
the relevant period-is widely accepted by commentators as an
appropriate measure of economic income," but even within a
protected, although eliminating all deductions for ordinary and necessary business expenses
would be problematic. See JENSEN, supra note 83, at 118.
86. New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934) (noting that the "power
to tax income ... extends to the gross income").
87. 292 U.S. 371, 381 (1934). As Erwin Griswold noted, this is a statement of
congressional power, and the consequence is that denying a deduction is a particularly robust
means of federal regulation. See Erwin N. Griswold, An Argument Against the Doctrine that
Deductions Should Be Narrowly Construed as a Matter of Legislative Grace, 56 HARV. L. REV.
1142, 1143 n.8 (1943).
88. See HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A
PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 50 (1938) ("Personal income may be defined as the algebraic sum
of (1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of
the store of property rights between the beginning and end of the period in question.");
MICHAEL J. GRAEZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND
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Haig-Simons framework, vexing problems remain in properly
characterizing deductions. The deduction for charitable contri-
butions is necessary to properly define income in the eyes of some,
but represents a subsidy for others.89 Stanley Surrey and Paul
McDaniel considered the failure to allow a deduction for all
wagering losses to be a tax penalty.o Others view wagering losses
as nondeductible consumption.9 '
Of course, the baseline problem and the ambiguity of deductions
are quite familiar to those interested in tax policy. These difficulties
have been at the center of the debate over the coherence of tax
expenditure analysis since the 1960s. Tax expenditures, as Surrey
and others defined them, are positive (that is, pro-taxpayer) devi-
ations from a "normal" income tax.92 In other words, tax expendi-
tures are subsidies." Surrey argued that the Code was an inefficient
means of delivering subsidies,9 4 and advocated and ultimately
achieved an annual accounting of tax expenditures comparable to
the direct federal spending budget." A fundamental problem with
tax expenditure analysis, however, as Boris Bittker and others
POLICIES 97 (6th ed. 2009) (noting that the Simons definition "is the most widely accepted"
and that it is considered to be a refinement of a definition provided by Robert Haig, hence the
"Haig-Simons" definition).
Although the Haig-Simons definition of income is widely accepted in the context of the
individual income tax, its application to the corporate income tax is less well established. See
William D. Andrews, Is Tax Exemption a Subsidy? 12 (1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the William and Mary Law Review).
89. Compare William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV.
L. REv. 309, 344-75 (1972) (arguing that the deduction for charitable contributions is
consistent with an ideal income tax on personal consumption and accumulations), with
SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 3, at 205 (arguing that charitable contributions represent
consumption and are properly categorized as tax expenditures).
90. See SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 3, at 224.
91. See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, The Man Who Lost Too Much: Zarin v. Commissioner and
the Measurement of Taxable Consumption, 45 TAX L. REV. 215, 230-33 (1990) (analyzing the
consumption aspects of gambling).
92. See, e.g., Surrey, Tax Incentives, supra note 3, at 706-07.
93. See id.
94. See id. at 734-35; see also SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM, supra note 3, at 140-41;
SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 3, at 26-27.
95. See Edward A. Zelinsky, The Tax Reform Act of 1986: A Response to Professor Yono
and His Vision of the Future of the Internal Revenue Code, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 885, 893-94
(1987).
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argued, is the arbitrariness of the baseline and the impossibility of
nailing down the "normal" income tax.'
One response to Bittker's criticism is that although there may be
a zone of ambiguity as a result of the lack of an authoritative net
income baseline, the appropriate characterization of many deduc-
tions is uncontroversial within a broad range of competing concep-
tions of net income. For example, deductions for office rent and
employee wages are clearly appropriate adjustments in determining
net income, whereas allowing an immediate deduction of certain
capital expenditures clearly represents a subsidy. Not all deductions
are equally ambiguous.
Nonetheless, the fact that some deductions, exemptions, and tax
credits clearly do constitute subsidies, combined with the lack of
authoritative categorization of deductions, may contribute to the
tendency to adopt a gross income baseline in conceptualizing
deductions generally.
3. Choice of Baseline-False Equality of Those Not Similarly
Situated
A tendency to focus on the expense and deduction, to neglect the
associated income inclusion, and thus to improperly compare
business and nonbusiness taxpayers, may further contribute to the
characterization of deductions as subsidies. In a related attempt to
distinguish penalties from nonsubsidies, Seth Kreimer suggested
that one appropriate baseline is equality of treatment of those
similarly situated." Given this intuitive baseline, a business that is
allowed a deduction that is not allowed to nonbusiness taxpayers
appears to receive a subsidy. For example, in Cammarano v. United
States, the Supreme Court addressed a taxpayer challenge to a
Treasury regulation that disallowed deduction of certain lobbying
and political advocacy expenses." The taxpayer argued, inter alia,
that disallowance of an otherwise ordinary and necessary business
expense deduction for amounts expended on publicity to influence
96. See, e.g., Boris I. Bittker, Accounting for Federal "Tax Subsidies" in the National
Budget, 22 NAVL TAX J. 244, 254-55, 260 (1969).
97. See Kreimer, supra note 78, at 1363-71.
98. 358 U.S. 498, 499-500 (1959).
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the voting public on a ballot measure crucial to its business was
tantamount to a penalty for engaging in protected First Amendment
activity." The Court disagreed. Adopting a baseline of nondeduction
of political advocacy expenditures by nonbusiness taxpayers, the
Court stated that the Cammaranos were "simply being required to
pay for [their political] activities entirely out of their own pockets,
as everyone else engaging in similar activities is required to do
under the ... Code," and that the likely intent behind the regulation
was that "everyone in the community should stand on the same
footing ... so far as the Treasury of the United States is concerned"
with respect to the purchase of "publicity [that] can influence the
fate of legislation which will affect [it]."100
Presumably, the Court's idea was that because private citizens
who might favor the referendum would not be entitled to deduct
their lobbying expenses, equality demanded that the Cammaranos
not be allowed to deduct their lobbying expenses either. A statute
that leveled the playing field in this way would not penalize the
Cammaranos, but would simply deny them a potential subsidy. This
seems logical enough, but arguably the Cammaranos and ordinary
citizens were not similarly situated absent the deduction. Any
benefit that ordinary citizens received from lobbying in favor of the
referendum, ranging from psychic benefits to lower prices, would not
be taxed. The benefits to the Cammaranos-the profits of a con-
tinued franchise-would be taxed. If this is right, the Treasury
regulation did not serve to level the playing field, and equality was
not a logical basis for concluding that the Treasury regulation
merely eliminated a taxpayer subsidy.'0'
99. Id. at 512-13.
100. Id. at 513.
101. In the simplest case, suppose that a referendum is proposed that would result in a
zero-sum economic transfer from businesses to consumers and that the referendum would
have no other effect. In this zero-sum case, absent taxes, businesses should be willing to spend
up to a dollar to avoid a transfer of a dollar and consumers would be willing to spend up to a
dollar to achieve a transfer of a dollar. Now suppose, as is true under current law, that the
additional business profit of a dollar is subject to tax, but that business lobbying is not
deductible. If businesses are taxed at a 35 percent marginal rate, they would only be willing
to spend 65 cents pre-tax to avoid a transfer of a dollar, because the incremental dollar profit
pre-tax would only produce 65 cents after-tax. Meanwhile, consumers would continue to be
willing to spend a dollar to gain a dollar because their benefit-say, lower prices-would not
be taxed. The playing field in this case is not level, but permitting a deduction for business
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B. Rhetorical Framing
The tendency to conceive of deductions as subsidies may be
reinforced by political rhetoric explicitly framing deductions as
subsidies. It is well established that "individuals react to the purely
formal way in which a question is presented or 'framed.""'0 2 And one
of the arguments to be developed in Part III is that the rhetoric of
subsidy can be a powerful force in overcoming laissez-faire opposi-
tion to regulation and perhaps even in attracting votes for a judicial
opinion imposing regulation.
Thus, it should come as no surprise that this type of rhetoric is
frequently employed. In 1993, for example, President Clinton pro-
posed the legislation that would ultimately become section 162(m),
limiting the deductibility of non-performance-based pay granted to
top corporate executives. 0 3 Part II.A argued that deduction of
employee compensation lies within the unambiguous core of
deductions that properly define net income and are not subsidies.
Nonetheless, Clinton adopted subsidy rhetoric, arguing that "the
Tax Code should no longer subsidize excessive pay of chief execu-
tives and other high executives."'04
lobbying would restore equilibrium. If business lobbying is deductible, businesses again would
be willing to match consumer spending on lobbying, because a dollar spent by businesses to
save a dollar would result in matched after-tax cost and produce a benefit of 65 cents.
Of course, the playing field may not be level for other reasons. Consumer interests may face
a greater collective action problem in organizing to lobby than businesses. But apparently the
Court in Cammarano was not thinking of such possibilities when it spoke of a congressional
goal that all "stand on the same footing ... so far as the Treasury of the United States is
concerned." Id.
Finally, note that the foregoing analysis does not rely on the existence of a matching stream
of includable income in characterizing a business expense as a normatively appropriate
adjustment to taxable income. In some cases, there may be no income associated with an
expense that lies at the unambiguous core of deductions that properly define net income, but
deduction remains normatively correct because the expenditure does not represent
consumption or capital investment. Business casualty losses might be one example.
102. Edward J. McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1861, 1905-16
(1994) (suggesting several examples of the importance of framing in individuals' responses to
tax incentives, including a preference for excludable "fringe benefits" over programs requiring
inclusion and deduction).
103. See Center on Executive Compensation, Position on Section 162(m), http://www.
execcomp.org/positions/positionssecl62m.aspx (last visited Jan. 27, 2011).
104. Remarks to Business Leaders, 1 PUB. PAPERS 89 (Feb. 11, 1993).
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Rhetorical framing is effective because it is plausible, even if not
convincing. If one thought hard about it, one would realize that
allowing a deduction for compensation does not represent a tax
subsidy, but is a normatively appropriate adjustment in determin-
ing net income. But if one focuses solely on the deduction, it appears
that the government is contributing to senior executive pay. And, of
course, the government is, in a way, but the contribution is no more
a subsidy than taxing profits is a penalty.
To be sure, opponents of an intervention of this sort may attempt
to fight rhetoric with rhetoric, arguing that deductions such as these
are not subsidies. Making such a nuanced argument in a sound-bite-
driven media environment is an uphill battle, however, and it seems
likely that subsidy rhetoric generally would prevail over nonsubsidy
rebuttal.
Explicit subsidy rhetoric such as this may have two effects. First,
as elaborated in Part III, it likely helps overcome opposition to a
specific proposed intervention. Second, the accumulation of sound-
bite subsidy rhetoric may reinforce the tendency of observers to
associate deduction with subsidy and to adopt the subsidy baseline
when thinking about deduction and disallowance.
C. Experimental Evidence on Mental and Rhetorical Framing
Experimental evidence supports the claims that observers view
economically equivalent direct penalties and tax disallowances
differently and that explicit subsidy rhetoric positively influences
public acceptance of regulation. Members of the Boston University
School of Law Class of 2010 received several different versions of a
survey question gauging their reaction to regulation of executive
pensions. Each version of the survey began with an identical
paragraph describing the purported problem: growth of executive
pensions far outpacing inflation.'s One version of the survey went
on to propose a direct penalty of 35 percent on excess executive
pension payments, defined as payments in excess of $1 million per
year. Respondents were asked to rate on a scale of 1 to 10 the degree
to which they would oppose or support this proposal, with a rating
105. See infra Appendix for the full text of these surveys.
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of 10 equating to the strongest support. The support ratings for this
proposal averaged 4.6.106
A second version of the survey replaced the direct penalty
proposal with a proposal to disallow corporate tax deductions for
pension payments in excess of $1 million per year, explaining that
for "typical" firms, the effect would be a 35 percent increase in the
effective cost of the excess payments. Thus, as structured, the direct
penalty and the tax penalty had equivalent economic effect. The
word "subsidy" was not used in this version. The only difference in
the two versions was the structure of the disincentive. The dis-
allowance-based proposal received an average support rating of
6.2.10' The 1.6 percentage point difference in the mean level of
support between these two versions was statistically significant.
These data suggest that structuring a disincentive as a disallowed
deduction affects acceptance. The subjects did not equate economi-
cally equivalent interventions. Of course, the experiment does not
establish that the reason for the difference in attitude was a
difference in baseline or a tendency to equate deduction with
subsidy.
A third version of the survey tested the impact of explicit subsidy
rhetoric. This version maintained the deduction disallowance
proposal, but unlike the second version which stated that the
"change in law would increase the effective cost to [the company] of
providing a $3 million pension by $700,000," the subsidy-framed
version stated that "[e]liminating the tax subsidy ... would save
taxpayers about $700,000."tos Framed as the elimination of a
taxpayer subsidy, the third version of the proposal received an
average support rating of 7.2.10 Again, the differences in the mean
level of support between this version of the survey and the other
versions were statistically significant.
These data suggest that structuring an intervention as a tax
disallowance and rhetorically framing the disallowance as the
elimination of a subsidy may be powerful in shaping public opinion
106. See infra Appendix (summarizing the statistics gathered from these surveys).
107. See infra Appendix.
108. See infra Appendix.
109. See infra Appendix.
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in favor of the intervention. The mean support ratings for each
version of the survey are portrayed in the following figure.











Direct Penalty Deduction Curtailment Deduction Curtailment(Neutral Framing) (Subsidy Framing)
III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF FRAMING DEDUCTION AS SUBSIDY
Mental and rhetorical framing of deduction as subsidy has several
important consequences. A court's choice of baseline may largely
determine the outcome of a case. Explicit rhetorical framing of
deduction as subsidy may yield sufficient votes to garner a majority
on appeal or smooth reception. More concretely, subsidy framing
may help explain judicial approval of the IRS's disallowance of a
number of business deductions on public policy grounds. Mental and
rhetorical framing may also have contributed to the codification by
Congress of these and other public policy disallowances. Moreover,
the regulatory illusion that flows from framing deduction as subsidy
may help explain why a number of corporate governance provisions
are found in the Code.
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A. Judicial Framing
Judicial opinions routinely equate deduction with subsidy and
adopt the corresponding baseline. These opinions certainly reflect
framing. The difficulty lies in distinguishing between mental
framing, in which the subconscious adoption of a baseline results in
the characterization of a deduction as subsidy and thus contributes
to a certain result, and rhetorical framing, in which the drafter
decides on other grounds but adopts subsidy characterization as a
purposeful rhetorical device in order to attract votes or to improve
reception of the opinion. Either way, it is important to understand
the role that deduction framing may be playing in tax cases.
1. Tank Truck and Common Law Disallowance of Deductions
on Public Policy Grounds
Judicial disallowance of otherwise ordinary and necessary
business expense deductions on public policy grounds goes back to
the early days of the federal income tax. In Commissioner v.
Heininger, the Supreme Court stated that the test for disallowance
was whether allowing the deduction would "frustrate sharply de-
fined national or state policies proscribing particular types of
conduct.""o Although the Court in Heininger held that deduction of
legal fees incurred in an unsuccessful defense against charges of
mail fraud was allowable, it provided several examples of situations
in which courts had disallowed deductions on public policy grounds,
including claimed deductions for fines or penalties incurred for
violation of state or federal statute,"' certain lobbying and political
activities," 2 and bribery."13
Implicitly or explicitly, these disallowance cases adopt a gross
income, pre-deduction baseline against which a deduction appears
to subsidize the disfavored behavior and thus to frustrate public
policy. For example, in an early case disallowing the deduction of
unspecified penalties paid to the government by the Great Northern
110. 320 U.S. 467, 473 (1943).
111. Id. (citing, inter alia, Great N. Ry. Co. v. Comm'r, 40 F.2d 372 (1930)).
112. Id. (citing, inter alia, Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Comm'r, 314 U.S. 326 (1941)).
113. Id. at 473-74 (citing, inter alia, Rugel v. Comm'r, 127 F.2d 393 (1942)).
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Railway, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals simply said that "[i]t
cannot be that Congress intended the carrier should have any
advantage, directly or indirectly, or any reduction, directly or
indirectly, of these penalties.""1 '
Perhaps the most frequently cited example of common law
disallowance of an otherwise ordinary and necessary business
expense deduction is the Supreme Court's 1958 opinion in Tank
Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner."'s There, the taxpayer, an
owner and operator of bulk liquid tankers, had paid fines for
exceeding Pennsylvania's maximum highway weight limit."' As the
Court explained, Pennsylvania restricted trucks to 45,000 pounds
while the surrounding states allowed 60,000 pound cargos."17
Finding it "economically impossible" to do otherwise, trucking
companies deliberately exceeded the Pennsylvania limitation, "in
the hope, and at the calculated risk, of escaping the notice of the
state and local police." 1 s
The IRS disallowed the deduction for the fines paid in Pennsylva-
nia on public policy grounds, and the Tax Court agreed that
allowing a deduction "would frustrate sharply defined state
policy."' Before the Supreme Court, the taxpayer argued that the
fines were equivalent to tolls for the use of the highways, and thus
should be deductible. 20 The Court disagreed, finding it "clear" that
the fines were punitive because they were assessed only when the
offenders were apprehended.' 2' The Court went on to affirm the
disallowance on public policy grounds. Although recognizing that
Congress intended to tax net income as a general matter, the Court
emphasized that an expense must be ordinary and necessary to be
deductible under the Code and held that an expense is not "neces-
114. Great N. Ry. Co., 40 F.2d at 373.
115. 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
116. Id. at 31-32.
117. Id. at 32.
118. Id. at 32-33.
119. Id. at 31.
120. Id. at 36.
121. Id. at 34. The Court did not explain why probabilistic assessment rendered the fines
punitive measures instead of user fees. Elsewhere, the Court recited facts that suggested
quite strongly that Pennsylvania's system of load limits and enforcement worked as user fees;
for example, the statute allowed for single-trip permit purchase by overweight truckers in lieu
of removal of excess weight. Id. at 36.
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sary" if deduction would thwart state policy.'22 Writing for a
unanimous Court, Justice Clark stated, 'To allow the deduction
sought here would but encourage continued violations of state law
.... This could only tend to destroy the effectiveness of the State's
maximum weight laws."'23
Although the word "subsidy" does not appear in the Tank Truck
opinion, and the test is not overtly about subsidization, baselines
and subsidy characterization lie at the root of the Court's analysis
in Tank Truck. The specific question before the Court was whether
allowing the deduction would thwart state policy.12 4 But to answer
that question with confidence, the Court would have needed infor-
mation on the Pennsylvania regulatory scheme that it lacked. If the
fines were set by the Pennsylvania regulator under the assumption
or expectation that they would not be deductible, deduction would
have tended to thwart state policy. If expectations were that fines
and penalties would be deductible as an ordinary business expense,
deduction would not necessarily have thwarted state policy.
The Tank Truck opinion implicitly adopted the former baseline.
Justice Clark stated that allowing these deductions would "encour-
age continued violations of state law" and "reduc[e] the 'sting' of the
penalty,"' 2' which is economically equivalent, but rhetorically
distinct, from saying that denying the deduction would discourage
violation or increase the sting of penalties. The baseline adopted by
the Court suggests that the deductions were conceived of as
subsidies, and, in fact, in an opinion issued three months later,
Justice Clark cited Tank Truck as an example of the "accepted
122. Id. at 33.
123. Id. at 35. The technical basis for the disallowance was that in order to be deductible,
a business expense must be ordinary and necessary, and that "[a] finding of 'necessity' cannot
be made ... if allowance of the deduction would frustrate sharply defined national or state
policies proscribing particular types of conduct, evidenced by some government declaration
thereof." Id. at 33-34. This statement is somewhat odd, however, given the Court's definition
of "necessary" in this context as meaning "appropriate and helpful" "for the development of
... business," which is considered a very low hurdle for deduction. See Welch v. Helvering, 290
U.S. 111, 113 (1933). Paying fines for regulatory violations would seem to be necessary in the
Welch sense, and logically it makes more sense to think of the public policy disallowances as
exceptions to the general rule that ordinary and necessary expenses are deductible rather
than as defining "necessary."
124. See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
125. Tank Truck, 356 U.S. at 35-36.
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practice" of disallowing deductions to avoid "subsidizing" behavior
contrary to public policy. 126
a. The (Missing) Analysis of Tank Truck
Like Justice Clark, we do not know the basis on which the
Pennsylvania regulator established fines for overweight trucks or
whether the regulator explicitly considered deductibility under the
federal income tax. My guess would be that the regulator did not
consider deductibility at all. Luckily, the intention of this Section is
not to resolve whether allowing the deductions sought by the
company would have undermined public policy, but to demonstrate
that it is plausible that allowing these deductions would have been
consistent with public policy. Once that is established, it becomes
clear that the Court's untested assumption that deduction equals
subsidy mattered to the outcome of the case, assuming, of course,
that one can take the Court's opinion at face value. Subsequently,
this Article will consider the possibility that Tank Truck reflects
rhetorical framing instead of, or in addition to, subconscious mental
framing. The analysis will focus on two models of sanctions that are
embraced by economists: optimal deterrence and complete deter-
rence.
i. Optimal Deterrence Model
Suppose, contrary to the Court's conclusion, that the Pennsylva-
nia fines were imposed as user fees and were calibrated (very
roughly, no doubt) to reflect the wear and tear and other costs re-
sulting from overweight trucks.'27 Taxes aside, that schedule of fines
would lead to full compensation for road damage, and it would also
result in optimal deterrence, which is the regulatory objective under
126. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 543 (1958) (Clark, J., dissenting).
127. The regulator would also factor enforcement into the level of the fine. If, in other
words, experience suggested that one out of every ten overweight truck trips resulted in
apprehension and a fine, the fine set would be ten times the fine that would be assessed if
enforcement were perfect. Of course, the government actually chooses the amount of resources
it devotes to enforcement and the corresponding probability of detection. This choice affects
the optimal fine. See infra note 129.
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this approach.128 As in the case of tolls, the regulator seeks not to
eliminate the behavior that results in a fine, but to cause shippers
to internalize the social costs. Shippers whose marginal gain from
violating the load limit exceeded the expected fine would overload
their trucks; others would not.
How would taxes figure into this equation? First, assume that the
regulator ignored taxes in determining the fines for overweight
trucking. In this case, deductibility would be consistent with
achieving the state's objectives. The costs resulting from overweight
trucks would be fully recovered because deductibility at the federal
level would not affect the state's receipts. Moreover, potential
violators would be optimally deterred. Suppose, for example, that
the regulator had determined that the average social cost of
overloaded trucks was $1 per pound of excess weight per trip, and
set its fines accordingly.' 29 Absent taxes, a shipper would overload
and pay the expected $1 per pound per trip fine if its gain from
overloading exceeded $1 per pound per trip. Assuming the shipper's
profits were taxable, however, $1 per pound per trip gain pre-tax
would leave only 65 cents after tax at a 35 percent marginal rate.
Obviously, this after-tax rate of gain would not justify the payment
of the fine, unless the fine was deductible. If the fine was deductible,
128. Setting the expected fine equal to the cost imposed results in optimal deterrence only
if the offender is risk neutral. See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND
ECONOMICs 79-90 (3d ed. 2003). If the potential offender is risk averse and enforcement is less
than perfect, this level of fine may result in over-deterrence. See id. For a potential offender
like Tank Truck Rentals-a business entity and a repeat player-risk neutrality is a
reasonable assumption.
129. If the expected rate of apprehension was one out of ten, the nominal fine would be set
at ten dollars per pound of excess weight. Gary Becker demonstrated that when potential
offenders are risk neutral, the total cost of law enforcement, including the social cost of
offenses committed, enforcement costs, and punishment costs (for the state and the offender),
can be reduced by increasing punishments and reducing enforcement. See Gary S. Becker,
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. EcON. 169, 183 (1968). An impli-
cation is that in some situations, a regulator might seek to impose very high punishments on
offenders. If penalties were deductible and the regulator failed to realize that, it might set a
lower penalty than it otherwise would. Nonetheless, as demonstrated here, any combination
of penalty and enforcement level that optimally deters potential offenders on a pre-tax basis
would continue to optimally deter if gains from the offense are includable and penalties are
deductible.
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the expected after-tax cost of 65 cents per pound per trip would
maintain the equilibrium and optimal deterrence.130
Of course, if the fines were calibrated to recover costs and the
regulator had assumed that they would be deductible for federal
income tax purposes, the analysis is exactly the same. Deductibility
would be consistent with the state's objectives. Disallowing the
deduction for fines paid in either of these cases results in
overdeterrence. The state fully recovers its costs, but because the
gain from overloading is taxed, denying the deduction for fines paid
results in some truckers not overloading in cases in which the
benefit exceeds the harm."'
If the objective of the Pennsylvania regulator was to recover the
costs imposed by overloaded trucks and deter truckers from
overloading inefficiently by forcing them to internalize the costs of
highway damage, deductibility would have been consistent with the
state's objectives, unless the regulator assumed that the fine would
not be deductible and reduced the nominal fine to maintain optimal
deterrence. This seems unlikely, because the reduced fine would not
fully compensate the state for the road damage, but it is possible.'32
130. See George G. Tyler, Disallowance of Deductions on Public Policy Grounds, 20 TAX L.
REV. 665, 667-68 (1965) (arguing that neutrality is achieved in some cases by permitting the
deduction (quoting Frank M. Keesling, Illegal Transactions and the Income Tax, 5 UCLA L.
REV. 26, 36-37 (1958))); Zolt, supra note 4, at 364-67 (showing that if an expected penalty is
set equal to the harm caused, disallowance of the tax deduction results in overdeterrence).
In this. particular situation, a rational taxpayer would compare the after-tax cost of
overloading against the after-tax benefit, taking into account the expected penalty if
apprehended. In other scenarios, the comparison might be between an expected penalty and
the alternative cost of precaution. Assuming that the cost of precaution would be deductible,
allowing a deduction for the penalty would result in optimal deterrence. See A. Mitchell
Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages:An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869,
928-29 (1998) (arguing that punitive damages that are calibrated to optimally deter disfavored
behavior should be deductible in a business context). Of course, some costs incurred in
precaution may be capital expenditures that are effectively deducted over time. In such a case,
immediate deduction of fines and penalties could result in a certain amount of under-
deterrence.
131. Suppose that the social costs of overweight trucking average $1 per pound per trip and
that the expected penalty is set at $1 per pound per trip. If the gain from overloading is
taxable, but fines are not deductible, a rational and risk-neutral business would not risk
incurring the fine unless the benefit from overloading was at least $1.54 per pound per trip
(assuming a 35 percent marginal tax rate). Firms that valued overloading between $1 and
$1.54 per pound per trip would be inefficiently deterred in this case.
132. Suppose that the social costs of overweight trucking average $1 per pound per trip.
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ii. Complete Deterrence Model
Of course, the Court in Tank Truck rejected the idea that the
Pennsylvania fines were akin to tolls or user fees, finding instead
that they were punitive."'3 Apparently, the Court viewed the
Pennsylvania regulation as being aimed at complete deterrence
instead of optimal deterrence, that is, aimed at barring overloading
and punishing violators. That Court and a number of others have
treated this distinction as if it were critical in determining the
normatively appropriate tax treatment of fines and penalties, but it
is not obvious that it is.134 The fact that behavior is illegal does not
necessarily mean that associated expenses are nondeductible. 13 So
the question remains whether allowing a deduction for a punitive
fine aimed at complete deterrence would undermine public policy.
The answer, again, depends on how the fine was set. One ap-
proach to complete deterrence is to set penalties sufficiently high so
as to offset the private benefit that would follow from participating
in the proscribed activity, hence deterring participation even if the
benefits to the potential violator exceed the social costs. For
example, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) civil penalties are
based initially on the benefits achieved by avoiding or delaying
If the gain from overloading is taxable, but fines are not deductible, the optimally deterring
penalty at a 35 percent marginal tax rate would be 65 cents per pound per trip. At this
expected fine level, a shipper who valued overloading in excess of $1 per pound per trip would
overload; others would not.
133. See Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Comm'r, 356 U.S. 30, 34 (1958).
134. See Comment, Business Expenses, Disallowance, and Public Policy: Some Problems
of Sanctioning with the Internal Revenue Code, 72 YALE L.J. 108, 120-21 (1962) [hereinafter
Business Expenses] (summarizing cases). To be sure, the distinction is important today as a
matter of positive law. Under the regulations implementing section 162(c), compensatory
damages paid to the government are not considered nondeductible fines or penalties. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-21(b)(2) (2010); see also Mason & Dixon Lines, Inc. v. United States, 708
F.2d 1043, 1048 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that liquidated damages paid in addition to fines for
truck overloading were deductible).
135. This point was settled at the time the modern income tax was enacted. A proposal to
limit deductions to those incurred in lawful trade was rejected by the Senate Committee
drafting the 1913 income tax law. As Senator John Sharp Williams argued on the floor, "[The
object of this bill is to tax a man's net income .... It is not to reform men's moral characters ....
The law does not care where he got it from, so far as the tax is concerned, although the law
may very properly care in another way." 50 CONG. REC. 3849 (1913).
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compliance.136 Of course, a regulator could ensure compliance by
creating draconian punishments for even minor offenses, but
excessive punishments create their own costs, such as error costs.1 37
They may deter actors from engaging in legal activities that might
erroneously be judged to be illegal. Thus, the idea behind penalty
schemes of this type is to deter disfavored behavior but to do so
without applying excessive penalties that can create their own costs.
Given the reportedly common practice of truckers exceeding the
Pennsylvania weight restrictions, it seems unlikely that the
Pennsylvania regulator was seeking complete deterrence, but
assume for the sake of argument that the approach described above
had been adopted. It turns out that the appropriate tax treatment
under this regime is the same as it was under an optimal deterrence
regime.
The only case in which deductibility of penalties would undermine
public policy in this scenario would be one in which the regulator,
in calculating the benefit of overloading, and hence the penalty,
reduced the pre-tax benefit by the tax rate.' If the regulator did
not consider taxation in calculating the benefits of overloading, or
if the regulator assumed that the penalty would be deductible and
hence based the penalty on the pre-tax benefit, allowing a deduction
for fines paid would be the neutral tax treatment, because both the
pre-tax cost and benefit of overloading would be reduced by the tax
rate.
The previous two examples of how fines and penalties are set are
quite stylized. It seems unlikely that this degree of analysis and
precision is typical of the process of setting fines and penalties. As
a general matter, however, as long as fines are limited based on
136. Willfulness and other factors determining the gravity of violations are factored in as
well. See EPA, POLIcY ON CIVIL PENALTIES: EPA GENERAL ENFORCEMENT POLICY #GM-21, at
5(1984), availableat http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/civil/penalty/epapolicy-
civilpenalties021684.pdf.
137. See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton & Vikramaditya Khanna, A Public Choice Theory of
Criminal Procedure, 15 SUP. CT. EcON. REV. 61, 63 (2007).
138. If, for example, the estimated pre-tax benefit of overloading was $1 per pound per trip,
and the regulator set the expected fine equal to the after-tax benefit of 65 cents per pound per
trip, allowing a violator to deduct the 65 cents per pound per trip penalty would undermine
the regulatory scheme.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
error costs or similar considerations, and assuming that federal
income tax considerations are ignored in setting fines, which seems
likely, it appears that allowing the deduction of fines preserves on
an after-tax basis the balance sought on a pre-tax basis.13 9
To be sure, if the Pennsylvania regulator had determined that the
appropriate penalty was $X per pound per trip for overloading, and
consciously decided that violators should bear this level of punish-
ment on an after-tax basis, deductibility obviously would thwart
state policy. But what would be the rationale for imposing punish-
ment on an after-tax basis?
One might think the rationale would arise from notions of
equality, consistency, or fairness.14 0 It might be felt unfair that com-
panies would be allowed to deduct as business expenses fines for
overloaded trucks, whereas ordinary taxpayers would be unable to
deduct their speeding tickets. But the unfairness or inconsistency
at the surface may fall away once one considers the entire transac-
tion or series of transactions and realizes that any profits from
overloading are taxed in the former case, but the benefits of
speeding outside of a business context generally are not.
Finally, even if deductibility does not produce actual inequality,
it may create an appearance of inequality, and that appearance may
undermine norms encouraging voluntary compliance with traffic
and other regulations. In this way, allowing businesses to deduct
fines and penalties might undermine public policy, but there is no
indication in the Tank Truck opinion that the Court had anything
like this in mind.
139. As a final example, suppose that the Pennsylvania regulator sought complete
deterrence but realized that if the fine for overloading was set too high, truckers would
wastefully underload to avoid the risk of wrongful assessment, perhaps due to a risk of
inaccurate scales. In this scenario, the regulator balances the risk and social costs imposed
by the offenders most difficult to deter against the social cost of general underloading and
arrives at some compromise fine. Assuming that the regulator's assessments were made
ignoring federal income tax consequences, once taxes are taken into account the balance is
preserved by allowing deduction for the fines.
140. For example, the EPA civil penalty guidelines stress that in addition to offsetting the
benefits achieved by noncompliance, penalty programs should produce "fair and equitable
treatment of the regulated community," displaying "both consistency and flexibility." EPA,
supra note 136, at 4.
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b. The Impact of Baseline Selection in Tank Truck
As the previous Section demonstrates, it is not obvious that
allowing a deduction for overweight truck fines would have
undermined Pennsylvania policy even if one accepts the Court's
interpretation that these fines were punitive. As a result, if one
takes the Court's opinion at face value, mental framing of deduction
as subsidy was a critical factor in the outcome.
Why is this the case? First consider Justice Clark's emphatic
assertion in the opinion that the fines paid were not tolls but were
punitive assessments.141 It was necessary to make this distinction
because highway tolls were clearly deductible as ordinary and
necessary expenses. 42 If the Court had been persuaded that the
fines were essentially tolls, deductibility would have been all but
assured.
It is important to understand that the different tax treatment of
tolls and fines within the Court's framework is not the result of a
view that the deduction for tolls does not represent a subsidy. Given
the baseline adopted in Tank Truck, all deductions are subsidies.14 3
Companies are allowed the subsidy of a deduction for tolls and
similar expenses, however, because these deductions do not violate
public policy.144
In my view, the thought process in Tank Truck and similar cases
reflects the following faulty syllogism: (1) deduction equals subsidy;
(2) subsidization of disfavored activity undermines public policy;
and therefore, (3) deduction undermines public policy. The syllogism
is faulty because the initial premise is questionable at best. Not all
deductions constitute subsidies, and deductions for fines and
penalties paid, in particular, may be normatively appropriate
adjustments in determining net income. If the Court had conceptu-
alized the underlying deduction not as a subsidy, but as a normal
adjustment to income, or had recognized the potential ambiguity, it
141. Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Comm'r, 356 U.S. 30, 34, 36 (1958).
142. I.R.C. § 162(a) (2006).
143. Again, the Tank Truck opinion did not use the word "subsidy," but it adopted a pre-
deduction baseline that would presumably apply equally to tolls and fines. See Tank Truck,
356 U.S. at 34, 36.
144. See id. at 33-34.
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would not have been so obvious that allowing the deduction would
have undermined Pennsylvania policy. At the least, it would seem
that the Court would have had to consider the underlying basis for
the penalty as sketched out above.
2. Nonsubsidy Framing in Sullivan
It is instructive to compare the framing in Tank Truck with that
in Commissioner v. Sullivan, an opinion issued on the same day, in
which the Court refused to disallow deductions for certain business
expenses of an illegal bookmaker." 5 In contrast to the pre-deduction
baseline adopted in Tank Truck, the Sullivan opinion adopted a net
income baseline, a difference that may help explain the oft-noted
inconsistency in the results.
The specific question in Sullivan was whether an illegal book-
making business could deduct expenses for wages and rental
payments.146 Significantly, the payment of rent for bookmaking
operations was also illegal under state law.14' A unanimous Court
held the payments deductible. 4 s Writing for the Court, Justice
Douglas noted that wages and rental payments were ordinary and
necessary expenses.149 He argued that Treasury regulations spec-
ifying that the federal excise tax on gambling was deductible
suggested that rent and wages should be deductible as well."so The
Court held that, given these circumstances, it was up to Congress
to make the decision to disallow these deductions and impose tax on
the basis of gross income.' 5 1 Judicial disallowance of the deductions
sought for fines and penalties in Tank Truck was distinguishable,
according to Justice Douglas, because "allowance [would be] a device
to avoid the consequence of violations of a law."'52
145. 356 U.S. 27, 29 (1958).
146. Id. at 27.
147. Id. at 28.
148. Id. at 28-29.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 28-29.
151. Id. at 29.
152. Id.
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Commentators have had difficulty squaring Tank Truck and
Sullivan.'5 3 First, the Court in Tank Truck held that a finding of
"necessity" supporting an ordinary and necessary deduction could
not be made if allowance would frustrate sharply defined state
policy and that "frustration of state policy is most complete and
direct when the expenditure for which deduction is sought is itself
prohibited by statute.""'4 In Sullivan, the Court did not explain why
expenses for rent remained "necessary" when made in express
violation of state law.'55 Second, the existence of a Treasury regu-
lation supporting deduction of federal excise taxes on gambling
seemed to have no bearing on the question whether deduction of
illegal rental payments would frustrate state policy.'56 Third, al-
though allowance of a deduction for fines and penalties would
mitigate the consequences of a violation of law, and is distinguish-
able from allowance of deductions for rent and wages, the latter are
analogous to other deductions that had previously been disallowed
as violating public policy, such as for amounts expended in lobbying
and bribery. And yet there was nothing in the Court's opinion to
indicate that these holdings were overruled or to explain why the
distinction mattered.'
So what does account for the inconsistent outcomes of these two
cases? Bernard Wolfman has suggested that "Douglas did not devote
as much attention to tax cases in this period as he had previously"'
and that read in light of Tank Truck, Justice Douglas's Sullivan
opinion "simply fails to illuminate the crucial issues.""' On the
153. See, e.g., Bernard Wolfman et al., The Behavior of Justice Douglas in Federal Tax
Cases, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 235, 260-62 (1973); Business Expenses, supra note 134, at 126, 137-
41; see also James W. Colliton, The Tax Treatment of Criminal and Disapproved Payments,
9 VA. TAX REV. 273, 275-76 (1989); Cathryn V. Deal, Reining in the Unruly Horse: The Public
Policy Test for Disallowing Tax Deductions, 9 VT. L. REV. 11, 31 (1984); Jacob L. Todres,
Internal Revenue Code Section 162(f): An Analysis and Its Application to Restitution Payments
and Environmental Fines, 99 DICK. L. REV. 645, 655-56, 660-61 (1995).
154. Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Comm'r, 356 U.S. 30, 35 (1958).
155. See Wolfman et al., supra note 153, at 262; Business Expenses, supra note 134, at 138.
156. See Wolfman et al., supra note 153, at 262; Business Expenses, supra note 134, at 139.
157. See Business Expenses, supra note 134, at 138-39.
158. Wolfman et al., supra note 153, at 260.
159. Id. at 261.
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other hand, the judgments in both Tank Truck and Sullivan were
unanimous."'o
A striking difference between Tank Truck and Sullivan lies in
the choice of baseline and the framing of the opinions, which are 180
degrees apart. In Tank Truck, Justice Clark's selection of a pre-
deduction baseline caused deduction of fines to look like a subsidy
for bad behavior, reducing the "sting" of the penalties. Justice
Douglas's baseline in Sullivan was allowance of "the normal de-
ductions of ... rent and wages."16 ' Justice Douglas emphasized that
the disallowance in Sullivan "would come close to making this type
of business taxable on the basis of its gross receipts, while all other
business would be taxable on the basis of net income."'62 Instead of
comparing business and nonbusiness taxpayers, which is typical in
public policy disallowance cases, Justice Douglas compared a group
of taxpayers engaged in legal business with a group involved in
illegal business. This approach is not surprising. The IRS's position
in Sullivan was that a subset of business taxpayers should be
denied certain deductions on public policy grounds, whereas its
position in Cammarano was that no taxpayer should be allowed a
deduction for lobbying or political activities.'63 Nonetheless,
emphasis in Sullivan on the norm of deduction of rent and wages for
the typical business highlights the nonsubsidy nature of these
deductions. Given this baseline, disallowance looks like a penalty,
and perhaps helps explain the conclusion that if this choice is to be
made, "Congress should do it."'64
3. Rhetorical Versus Mental Framing in Case Law
It is impossible to determine the extent to which subconscious
framing of deductions as subsidies or nonsubsidies contributed to
the results in Tank Truck and Sullivan. Another possibility is that
160. See supra notes 123, 148 and accompanying text.
161. Comm'r v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27, 29 (1958).
162. Id.
163. Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 507-08 (1959). In this respect, the
situation in Sullivan was analogous to that of Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467
(1943), in which the Court refused to disallow deduction for legal fees in unsuccessful defense.
164. Sullivan, 356 U.S. at 29.
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other factors decided the vote of one or more of the Justices and that
the framing of the opinions was selected ex post as a rhetorical
device. It is well established that judges care about the reception of
their opinions by the public and the other political branches, and
appellate judges sitting on panels would certainly care about
achieving a majority or perhaps unanimity."es Thus, a judge might
understand that the subsidy question is nuanced or even that the
subsidy label is inapposite, but still adopt explicit subsidy framing
in an attempt to court votes or soften reception.
So, although the differing choice of baseline in Tank Truck and
Sullivan may have influenced the disparate outcomes, the Court
might have adopted the baselines ex post to help rationalize the
conflicting outcomes. Perhaps the conflicting outcomes actually
reflected a view that deductions for wages and rental payments lay
nearer to the core of adjustments needed to properly determine net
income than did deductions for fines and penalties, and thus greater
deference to Congress was warranted in the former case. Or perhaps
the difference reflected a view that disallowance of a particular set
of deductions to all business taxpayers was less objectionable and
more appropriately the subject of administrative or judicial action
than disallowance for a subset of taxpayers, even if that subset
consisted of illegal businesses. One cannot know.
Given the fact that the word "subsidy" does not appear in the
Tank Truck opinion, it seems likely that subconscious mental
framing had more to do with the outcome there than conscious
rhetorical framing. The same cannot be said for the 1983 majority
opinion in Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, in
which the Supreme Court upheld restrictions against substantial
lobbying by tax-exempt, nonprofit organizations eligible to receive
tax deductible contributions against First and Fifth Amendment
challenges."'6 In that opinion, Justice Rehnquist explicitly equated
165. See generally LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998)
(explaining that Justices concerned with legitimacy, compliance, and a potential legislative
override would consider preferences of the public and other political branches and providing
evidence that Justices make substantive sacrifices to gain majority support); Kevin T.
McGuire & James A. Stimson, The Least Dangerous Branch Revisited: New Evidence on
Supreme Court Responsiveness to Public Preferences, 66 J. POL. 1018, 1019 (2004) (providing
evidence that Justices are highly responsive to public opinion).
166. 461 U.S. 540, 542, 551 (1983).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
tax deductions and exemptions to cash grants, stating that both "are
a form of subsidy that is administered through the tax system."e7
This is certainly an overbroad statement. Only by adopting a
gross income baseline would all deductions constitute subsidies
without exception. And the overbroad generalization was accompa-
nied by particularly intense subsidy rhetoric. Justice Rehnquist
used the term "subsidy," or a variation thereof, twenty-five times in
seven pages of analysis.168
The substantive questions raised in the Taxation with
Representation case fall within the Supreme Court's notoriously
difficult "unconstitutional conditions" jurisprudence, 6 9 and this
Article will not attempt to analyze them. The gist of Justice
Rehnquist's argument, however, was that restrictions on lobbying
by public charities did not infringe on First Amendment rights
because Congress had simply chosen not to subsidize their lobbying
with taxpayer funds."7 o Given the slipperiness of the doctrine in this
area, strong rhetorical framing of the deductions and exemptions at
issue as subsidies quite possibly could have contributed to the
production of a unanimous decision in the case."
B. Political Framing
As in the case of common law disallowance, codification of various
"public policy" exceptions to the deductibility of otherwise ordinary
and necessary business expenses may reflect mental framing-an
unexamined baseline assumption on the part of legislators that
permitting a deduction for penalties, antitrust treble damages,
government settlements, and the like, subsidizes the underlying
disfavored activity. But legislators have an additional incentive to
favor disallowance of these deductions. Even if a legislator believed
that allowing a deduction was the neutral tax response, the ap-
167. Id. at 544.
168. Id. at 544-50.
169. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413,
1415-16 (1989) ("[Recent Supreme Court decisions on challenges to unconstitutional
conditions seem a minefield to be traversed gingerly.").
170. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. at 546.
171. The only separate opinion was a concurrence filed by Justice Blackmun that was
joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall. Id. at 551.
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pearance of subsidy and the attendant public outrage might
encourage her to support disallowance nonetheless. As a result, one
might expect Congress to be more energetic than the courts in
reacting to apparent tax subsidies and disallowing various deduc-
tions as a matter of "public policy."
In addition, when a business deduction or exemption is associated
with a disfavored activity, politicians may choose to structure
regulation as a disallowance rather than as a direct mandate or
some other nontax disincentive in order to take advantage of the
appearance of subsidy. This structural choice may disarm laissez-
faire opposition to-and improve public reception of-government
intervention that might appear to be punitive if introduced outside
of the tax code. Reception can be further improved by explicitly
framing the underlying deduction in subsidy terms. These framing
effects may help explain why corporate governance and similar
nontax regulation is sometimes incorporated in the Code.
1. Mental Framing and Codification of Public Policy
Disallowances
In 1969, Congress codified a number of the "public policy"
exceptions to the generally permissive "ordinary and necessary"
business expense deduction standard.172 These provisions include
section 162(c), which disallows deductions for illegal bribes, kick-
backs, and other illegal payments,'73 section 162(f), which disallows
deductions for "fine [s] or similar penalt[ies] paid to a government for
the violation of any law,"'74 and section 162(g), which disallows
deductions for two-thirds of antitrust treble damages payments
when associated with a criminal conviction."' Section 162(e), which
disallows deductions for certain lobbying expenses, was enacted in
1962.1" Subsequently, Congress has enacted other disallowance
172. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 902(b), 83 Stat. 487, 710-11.
173. I.R.C. § 162(c) (2006).
174. Id. § 162(f).
175. Id. § 162(g). Unlike deductions for bribes, fines, and penalties, deductions for antitrust
treble damages had not been disallowed by the courts prior to the enactment of section 162(g).
See Rev. Rul. 64-224, 1964-2 C.B. 52 (permitting full deduction of antitrust treble damage
awards).
176. Section 162(e) was amended in 1993 to further curtail deductions for lobbying and
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provisions that might constitute reaction to an appearance of
subsidy, including section 280E, which disallows deduction of
certain expenses incurred in illegal drug trafficking," and
section 162(m), which limits the deductibility of senior executive
compensation that is not performance-based.7 8
To some extent, the codified public policy disallowances probably
reflect the same inclination to equate deduction with subsidy that
led the courts to disallow some of these deductions. The only
analysis in the Senate Report that recommended enactment of the
rules that would become sections 162(c), 162(f), and 162(g) ad-
dressed antitrust treble damage payments and stated that the issue
was whether the impact of the penalties "should be reduced by
permitting them to reduce taxes which otherwise would have to be
paid.""' That is a fair description of the issue, but the implication
of the statement was that such a reduction would be bad policy.
That implication was made clear in the contrast drawn in the
Senate Report between antitrust policy and tax policy. Tax policy,
the report stated, disfavors deviations "from the concept of a tax
imposed on actual net business income.""o
However, given the fact that profits from anticompetitive
behavior would be taxed, it is not obvious that antitrust penalties
political advocacy. Under the current rule, lobbying of state and federal legislative and
executive officials is generally nondeductible as are amounts expended in attempting to
influence the public with regard to political matters. See I.R.C. § 162(e).
177. Id. § 280E.
178. Id. § 162(m). In my view, section 162(m) is better thought of as a proactive use of
subsidy framing than as a reaction to an appearance of subsidy and, thus, this section will be
addressed more thoroughly in Part III.B.2.
179. S. REP. No. 91-552, at 261 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, 2311. As
another possible example of subsidy confusion, consider the legislative history behind
section 280E, which disallows deductions or credits for expenses arising in connection with
trafficking in controlled substances. As stated in Senate Report 494, "To allow drug dealers
the benefit of business expense deductions at the same time that the U.S. and its citizens are
losing billions of dollars per year to such persons is not compelled by the fact that such
deductions are allowed to other, legal, enterprises." S. REP. No. 97-494, pt. 1, at 309 (1982),
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 781, 1050. If these deductions constitute benefits, all
deductions must constitute benefits. Of course, the drafters of this report may not have
actually believed that the allowance of ordinary business deductions subsidized illegal drug
trafficking. Instead, they may have adopted this rhetorical approach in order to appeal to the
public or to other legislators.
180. S. REP. No. 91-552, at 261.
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should be nondeductible even as a matter of antitrust policy. The
analysis is similar to and perhaps clearer than the analysis of fines
and penalties outlined in Part III.A.1. Deduction would be inconsis-
tent with antitrust policy only if the drafters of the treble damages
provision based the penalty on nondeductibility. But in 1890, when
the treble damages provision was adopted, there was no corporate
income tax. Presumably the drafters of the provision selected treble
damages (versus double or quadruple damages) as the appropriate
penalty on a no-tax basis after considering deterrence, compensa-
tion, error costs, and similar factors. The balance between effective
penalty and effective gain from anticompetitive behavior would have
been maintained with the introduction and ramp-up of the income
tax in the first half of the twentieth century. In 1969, however, the
effect of disallowing deductions for two-thirds of antitrust damage
payments was to disrupt this symmetry and increase the effective
level of deterrence relative to that put in place by the drafters of the
Sherman and Clayton Acts.18'
Nonetheless, the legislative history suggests that the drafters of
section 162(g) adopted a pre-deduction baseline that effectively
181. The antitrust treble damages provision was first enacted in 1890 as section 7 of the
Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), and reenacted in 1914 within section 4 of the
Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 731 (1914). The Civil War era income tax expired in 1872. A
national income tax was reintroduced in 1913 following the ratification of the Sixteenth
Amendment, but between 1913 and 1915, corporate income was taxed at a rate of only 1
percent. See THOMAS L. HUNGERFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., TAX EXPENDITURES AND THE
FEDERAL BUDGET 8 n.17 (2008); JACK TAYLOR, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., STATISTICS OF
INCOMEBULLETIN: CORPORATION INCOME TAX BRACKETSANDRATES, 1909-2002, at 287 (2003).
To be clear, the effective level of deterrence increased following the introduction of I.R.C.
section 162(g) because the financial gain from violations was taxable both before and after
1969, whereas the entire trebled penalty was deductible before and only one-third remained
deductible after. Of course, it is possible that public policy is better served under the current
tax law. The effect of section 162(g) is to "decouple" damage payments (two-thirds
nondeductible) from damage receipts (fully taxable). As a result, the effective cost to violators
exceeds the effective gain of successful plaintiffs assuming each is taxable at the highest
corporate rate. If, prior to the adoption of section 162(g), deterrence of potential violators was
inadequate, but incentives to sue were adequate, disallowing the deduction was a move in the
right direction. There is no indication in the legislative history, however, that the proposal to
enact section 162(g) developed from this sort of calculus. Moreover, as Mitchell Polinsky has
argued, although there is a sound case for decoupling antitrust damage payments and
receipts, the optimal system may involve plaintiffs receiving more after-tax than violators
pay. See A. Mitchell Polinsky, Detrebling versus Decoupling Antitrust Damages: Lessons from
the Theory of Enforcement, 74 GEO. L.J. 1231, 1231-32 (1986).
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categorized the existing deduction of treble damages as a subsidy.182
As we have seen, "subsidization" of illegal behavior appears
contrary to public policy. Absent a more thorough analysis of the
situation, the subsidy characterization may well have led to the
disallowance.
It is likely that appearance of subsidy also lies behind an ongoing
debate regarding the deductibility of corporate settlements with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and other regulators.
Under current law, the disallowance of deductions for fines and
penalties extends to amounts paid to settle "actual or potential
liability for a fine or penalty."' However, many settlements remain
deductible under this formulation, including settlements that
involve no admission of guilt or that are made early in the process
to forestall further investigation.'84 The Government Settlement
Transparency Act, introduced in 2003, would have broadened the
disallowance of deductions for settlements, but this legislation
was not enacted,' and some members of Congress remain dis-
satisfied with the status quo. For example, in 2006, Senators
Chuck Grassley, John McCain, and John Warner wrote a letter
to the Justice Department protesting a government settlement
with Boeing that did not specify the tax treatment of the deal.
Deductibility, the senators argued, would result in "leaving the
American taxpayer to effectively subsidize [the] misconduct."'
182. See S. REP. No. 91-552, at 262. One can only speculate as to why that baseline was
selected. Most likely, the drafters simply analogized the "punitive" two-thirds portion of treble
damages to fines and penalties, which the courts had long held nondeductible on public policy
grounds. Perhaps if the drafters of section 162(g) had considered the entire transaction and
the fact that added profits from anticompetitive behavior would be taxed, they might have
reached a different conclusion. But if they focused solely on the payment of damages, the
deduction would have produced an appearance of subsidy.
183. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-21(b)(1)(iii) (as amended in 1975).
184. See Press Release, Sen. Chuck Grassley, Grassley, Baucus Introduce Bill To Toughen
Corporate Settlements (Apr. 28, 2003), available at http://grassley.senate.gov/releases/2003/
p03r04-28.htm [hereinafter Grassley Press Release]. For examples of settlements, see cases
discussed in Robert W. Wood, Cleaning Up: Tax Deductions for Restitution, Fines, and
Penalties, TAX NOTEs, Jan. 26, 2009, at 490.
185. S. 936, 108th Cong. (2003); see Grassley Press Release, supra note 184 (explaining that
the proposed legislation would reach settlement amounts that are deductible under current
law).
186. Leslie Wayne, 3 Senators Protest Possible Tax Deduction for Boeing in Settling U.S.
Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2006, at C3.
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Of course, the analysis of the neutral tax treatment of settlements
reached with respect to alleged violation of law is the same as that
of fines and penalties incurred for violation, and I will not repeat it
here.'"' The bottom line is that as long as gains from the disfavored
activity are included in taxable income, it is not at all clear that
deduction of settlements in lieu of fines or penalties would under-
mine public policy or constitute a subsidy. Taken in isolation,
however, these deductions create an appearance of subsidy, which
likely contributes to legislation such as the Government Settlement
Transparency Act.
2. Subsidy Appearance and Response to Public Outrage
The public policy disallowance provisions, particularly the more
recently enacted or proposed provisions, including the above
mentioned Government Settlement Transparency Act, may have
been put forward partly in response to an appearance of subsidizing
illegal or otherwise undesirable activity and the attendant public
outrage that would follow if fines, penalties, settlements, and the
like were deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses.
Imagine that every time a business paid a large fine it was reported
that 35 percent of that fine would be "subsidized" by the federal
government through a tax deduction. Voters, not understanding
that deductibility might very well be the neutral response, would be
outraged. And this is not merely a speculative conjecture. Public
outcry was considerable when it was learned that Exxon would be
permitted to deduct the $1.1 billion settlement it reached with state
and federal government relating to the Exxon Valdez oil spill.'s It
is not surprising that a legislative response to such outrage ulti-
mately was offered.
To the extent that disallowance provisions are enacted for the
purpose of appealing to, and perhaps placating, outraged voters,
187. See supra Part III.A.1.
188. See, e.g., William P. Coughlin, Exxon Reportedly Gets Years To Pay Damages, BOSTON
GLOBE, Feb. 14, 1991 (reporting comments of an Alaskan environmental lawyer that "[i]f it
is true that they can write this off, it is a total outrage"); John D. McKinnon, Wages of
Corporate Sin: Tax Breaks-Companies Facing Claims for Sleazy Behavior Could Get
Windfall from the IRS, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 2002, at A4.
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rather than for the purpose of actually influencing the behavior of
those regulated, these provisions should be understood as symbolic
legislation. As political scientist Murray Edelman described, the
mass of uninformed voters may be satisfied with rhetoric and
regulation that on its face appears to address public concerns-
satisfied, in other words, with political symbols-even if tangible
resource allocation remains unaffected."1s Edelman highlighted the
use of symbolic legislation to reassure voters feeling threatened by
powerful economic forces.1 so Eliminating "subsidies" for fines and
penalties and lobbying expenses incurred by business interests
would appeal to exactly those concerns. Note that this is still a story
about subconscious mental framing of deduction as subsidy, but the
response is driven by framing on the part of constituents rather
than politicians. Even a politician who believes that deductibility of
settlements is the neutral tax response might be inclined to support
disallowance to curry favor with voters.
An appearance of subsidy and the risk of voter outrage, which are
addressed by disallowance provisions such as sections 162(c), 162(f),
and 162(g), exist only as long as section 162 exists. The appearance
of subsidy is essentially an unintended consequence of raising rev-
enue through a tax on net business income. If the corporate income
189. See MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS 22-27 (1964). Legislation is
generally viewed as serving direct instrumental purposes or fulfilling a symbolic or expressive
function. See Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The
Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1, 74-76 (1997). Unlike symbolic legislation, which is not directed
at the behavior of the regulated party, expressive legislation is meant to adjust behavior by
establishing or reinforcing social norms to which the regulated party responds. See id. at 75;
see also Michael S. Kirsch, Alternative Sanctions and the Federal Tax Law: Symbols,
Shaming, and Social Norm Management as a Substitute for Effective Tax Policy, 89 IOWA L.
REv. 863, 913-16 (2004) (evaluating alternative sanctions applied to tax avoiders under this
framework). It is conceivable that provisions such as sections 162(c) and 162(f) serve an
expressive function, but it seems more likely that these provisions are largely symbolic. See
Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process
as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 8-10 (1990) (discussing
symbolic aspects of 1980s tax legislation and the effects).
Of course, provisions such as section 162(f have an effect on resource allocation. Compared
with a regime in which fines and penalties were fully deductible, section 162(f) increases
funds available to the fise for redistribution and influences decision making by some potential
offenders. In my view, however, the primary purpose of these provisions has less to do with
resource allocation than with overcoming an appearance of subsidy.
190. See EDELMAN, supra note 189, at 37.
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tax were replaced by a national sales tax, for example, the problem
would vanish. It is obvious that, but for the income tax, the courts
never would have been asked to consider whether deductions for
fines or lobbying activities were ordinary and necessary. But more
importantly, to the extent that these public policy disallowances
were reactions to an appearance of subsidy, Congress would have no
incentive, in the absence of an income-based tax scheme, to enact
nontax economic disincentives aimed at, for example, lobbying or
behavior illegal under state law.
Under this view, these disallowances do not reflect an attitude in
Congress that punishments of offenders are insufficient and need a
federal tax "kicker" or that further economic disincentives need to
be placed in front of lobbyists."9' Thus, we would not expect
Congress to replace these disallowances even though their elimina-
tion as part of a broader elimination of the income tax would reduce
the deterrence of businesses engaged in these activities.
3. Mental and Rhetorical Framing and the Choice To Structure
Regulation as Tax Disallowance
In my view, when Congress codified the public policy disal-
lowances directed at the payment of fines and penalties, bribes, and
antitrust treble damages, it was essentially responding to a tax
problem-an appearance of subsidy inherent in a tax scheme based
on net income. There would have been no thought of looking outside
the tax code for a response to this problem. The limitations on
deductions for non-performance-based senior executive pay, for
excessive "golden parachute" payments, and, as proposed, for stock
option compensation that is not expensed for financial reporting
purposes, are different. These limitations respond to nontax con-
cerns. The responses easily could have been structured as mandates
(pay no more than $1 million per year in salary, limit golden
parachutes to three times average compensation, expense stock
options) or as economically equivalent tax-like penalties adminis-
191. But see infra note 195 and accompanying text (suggesting an alternative view under
which the public policy disallowances were enacted to increase disincentives).
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tered outside of the tax code.192 In fact, before proposing to disallow
deductions for stock option compensation not recognized as an
expense for accounting purposes, Senator Carl Levin had introduced
a bill in the Senate that would have directed the SEC to mandate
stock-option expensing."9 s
From an economic perspective, there is no real difference between
a disallowed deduction and a direct penalty. 19 4 So why would
Congress opt for the former? Of course, many considerations would
come into play, but the primary argument of this Section is that
structuring a disincentive as a disallowed deduction and rhetorically
framing the disallowance as the elimination or curtailment of a
taxpayer subsidy reduces the appearance of regulatory intervention,
thereby disarming laissez-faire opposition and increasing public
support generally. This illusion of minimal regulatory intervention
helps explain the choice to structure intervention as disallowance in
cases in which a preexisting deduction or exemption is associated
with a regulatory objective.
Although this Article has argued that the codification of the
public policy disallowances was largely a reaction to an appearance
of subsidy, it is possible that regulatory illusion also played a role.
Suppose a legislator in the mid-1960s believed that the deterrence
offered by the antitrust treble damages provision of the Clayton Act
was inadequate. The legislator might have proposed an increase in
damages to, say, four times the loss, but he also might have recog-
nized that it would be easier to convince his colleagues in Congress
that the deduction for treble damages allowed by the courts was an
inappropriate subsidy. More generally, a view that penalties im-
posed on businesses for misbehavior tend to be low and that
disallowance of deductions is a more palatable alternative than
increased nontax disincentives might help explain the push to
render government settlements nondeductible-and perhaps some
other "traditional" public policy disallowances as well.
However, I believe that the most compelling case for the power of
structuring and rhetorically framing regulation as tax disallowance,
192. See also I.R.C. § 162(k) (2006) (disallowing deductions related to greenmail payments).
193. Corporate Executives' Stock Option Accountability Act, S. 259, 103d Cong. (1993).
194. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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and for an explanatory relationship between regulatory illusion and
regulatory structure, can be made in the context of corporate
governance and similar regulations that appear in the Code."'9
Regulation of this nature is the focus of this Section.
a. Regulatory Options and Considerations
In exploring the effect of mental and rhetorical framing on the
structure of legislation, it may be helpful to consider the hypotheti-
cal problem that formed the basis of the student survey discussed
in Part II.C. Suppose an influential senator decided to propose
legislation regulating executive pensions. The senator might con-
sider proposing a ban on executive pensions, a cap on pension
payments, an SEC-imposed penalty on excessive pension payments,
or a limitation on the corporate tax deduction for executive pension
payments. Presumably, Congress has the power to enact any of
these measures. How would the senator go about selecting the best
regulatory option?
One can imagine many considerations that would factor into this
decision, including, of course, the substantive efficacy of the
regulation in each potential form and venue,196 the administrative
costs and benefits,"' and the impact of the choice of venue on the
195. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 162(m). Of course, it is possible that the corporate governance
disallowances were driven by the kind of public policy considerations addressed in the
previous Sections of this Article, that is, by an honest belief that the underlying deductions
undermine public policy or response to constituent outrage arising from an appearance of
subsidy. But managing public perception of subsidization seems to be a better explanation for
the disallowance of deductions for fines and penalties, for example, than it does for
disallowance of deductions for non-performance-based executive compensation or for stock
options that are not expensed on a firm's financial books. It seems unlikely that the public
would be any more outraged by a deduction for $100 million cash compensation than for a
stock option worth $100 million, or by a deduction for nonexpensed as opposed to expensed
stock option pay. This is not to say that section 162(m) was not a response to voter outrage
over excessive executive pay. The difference between section 162(m) and section 162(f) is that
the deduction of the pay did not create the outrage. The outrage existed independently of the
deduction. Under this view, disallowance was simply the means selected to respond to the
outrage.
196. One result of incorporating corporate governance regulation into the Code is that the
Treasury and IRS are left to interpret and administer the legislation instead of, say, the SEC,
which presumably has greater expertise in these matters.
197. Weisbach and Nussim argue that institutional considerations, such as administrative
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likelihood of enactment and the ease of enforcement. Moreover, the
attractiveness of potential venues would vary with the motivations
of the sponsoring legislators and would involve tradeoffs." This
Article argues that prospects for the enactment of corporate
governance regulation are likely enhanced by structuring the
regulation as a disallowance, but that doing so may come at a cost
of reduced effectiveness.
Enactment, of course, would be an important consideration
whether the goal of the effort was instrumental or symbolic, but by
definition, substantive efficacy would be of little or no importance
with respect to symbolic legislation. Although we cannot peer into
the minds of our legislators, my suspicion is that the regulation of
executive pay, severance arrangements, and other corporate govern-
ance matters that appear in the Code is to a large extent symbolic.
costs, specialization, and coordination, should determine whether federal programs are
implemented via the tax code or through other avenues. They focus on tax subsidies, but their
approach is equally applicable to the disincentives considered here. David A. Weisbach &
Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 957-58,
993-94 (2004).
198. There is vast literature addressing the motives of the various players in the political
process. Broadly, politicians are viewed as being motivated by self-interest and the public
interest. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Public Choice and the Law, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIoN ARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAw 171, 177 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (discussing the
public choice model); Shaviro, supra note 189, at 6-8 (describing and critiquing both the public
interest and public choice models). Self-interested motivations include not just a desire for
reelection, but for power and prestige, and possibly for attractive opportunities following a
career in public service. See RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITTEES 1 (1973)
(listing these goals as well as the goals of making good public policy and explicit personal
gain); Shaviro, supra note 189, at 81-87 (discussing personal motivations of members of
Congress beyond "narrow monetary self-interest"); see also R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC
OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 5-6 (1990) (arguing that reelection is the dominant motivation of
members of Congress, but that the quest for reelection can lead members to support both
particular and general interests). Although some commentators use the phrase "public choice
theory" to refer to the idea of legislation as a product that is sold to the highest bidder, the
phrase also can be used to encompass other self-interested motivations of politicians.
Undoubtedly, all of these motivations play a role in legislative strategy. This is not the
place to engage that debate, but this Article assumes that pure public interest is not the sole
criterion. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65
TEX. L. REv. 873, 924-25 (1987) (concluding from the empirical evidence that many members
of Congress act in the public interest, but that interest groups also exert significant influence
over legislation).
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b. Overcoming Resistance to Interference with Private
Contracting
Our hypothetical senator might prefer an outright ban as both the
most effective way of dealing with stealth compensation via
pensions and the means of making the highest-impact statement.
But, being a realist, the senator knows that he must deal with a
Congress composed of laissez-faire capitalists who take freedom of
private contracting very seriously, complete market skeptics who
would not be opposed to aggressive regulation, and members with
a range of views in between. Enacting federal legislation is never
easy,199 and, assuming that the senator values enactment as well as
the ultimate effect of the legislation enacted in reforming corporate
practices, he would be sensitive to the likely resistance by some of
his colleagues.200
How will these alternative regulatory schemes be viewed? The
first two options-the ban on executive pensions and the cap on pay-
ments-represent substantial interferences with private contracting
and are least likely to receive broad support in Washington.20' The
effect of a ban is fairly straightforward and transparent. A cap on
executive pension payments may appear to allow slightly more
freedom for private contracting than an outright prohibition, but a
cap is simply a ban above a threshold, and is unlikely to be per-
ceived much more favorably.202
Experience suggests that strongly coercive regulation of this type
is difficult to enact even in an environment in which few legislators
are willing to defend corporate interests. From a public relations
point of view, it is hard to imagine a worse decade for U.S. corporate
199. McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory
Interpretation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 11 (1994) ("[I]t is difficult and time-consuming
to change most prior legislative bargains.").
200. See ARNOLD, supra note 198, at 8 (arguing that legislative sponsors design proposals
to appeal to member preferences, which in Arnold's view are dominated by constituent
preferences and the quest for reelection).
201. See, e.g., Nicholas P. Dickerson, Comment, What Makes the Internet So Special? And
Why, Where, How, and by Whom Should Its Content Be Regulated?, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 61, 89
n.157 (2009).
202. Imagine replacing section 162(m) with a nontax fine meant to preclude delivery of non-
performance-based pay in excess of the $1 million limitation, for example, a fine equal to some
multiple of the excess non-performance-based pay.
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executives than the last. The decade began with the Enron and
WorldCom fiascos. 203 The stock option backdating scandal soon
followed.2 0 4 And we finished the decade still reeling from a financial
collapse that is widely attributed to executive greed and incompe-
tence, at least in the financial sector.205 Despite all of this, new
direct, substantive federal regulation of corporate governance has
been extremely limited, and significant coercive regulation in the
form of mandates or caps even more so. To be sure, with the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Congress increased disclosure requirements,
strengthened board and auditor independence requirements, and
actually banned corporate loans to executives.206 Moreover, pay czar
203. Enron filed the largest corporate bankruptcy in U.S. history on December 2, 2001.
Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Enron Corp. Files Largest U.S. Claim for
Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2001, at Al. WorldCom's filing on July 21, 2002, was
precipitated by an accounting scandal, and was over $40 billion larger than Enron's filing.
Simon Romero & Riva D. Atlas, WorldCom Files for Bankruptcy; Largest U.S. Case, N.Y.
TIMES, July, 22, 2002, at Al.
204. See, e.g., Charles Forelle & James Bandler, The Perfect Payday: Some CEOs Reap
Millions by Landing Stock Options When They Are Most Valuable, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18-19,
2006, at Al.
205. See, e.g., PRESIDENTS WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, POLICY STATEMENT
ON FINANCIALMARKET DEVELOPMENTS 1 (2008) (listing the following as the underlying causes
of the 2007 financial crisis: "(1) a breakdown in underwriting standards for subprime
mortgages; (2) a significant erosion of market discipline by those involved in the securitization
process, including originators, underwriters, [and] credit rating agencies ... ; (3) flaws in credit
rating agencies' assessments of subprime residential mortgage-backed securities and other
complex structured credit products ...; (4) risk management weaknesses at some large U.S.
and European financial institutions; and (5) regulatory policies, including capital and
disclosure requirements, that failed to mitigate risk management weaknesses").
206. Revelations of significant abuse prompted the loan ban. See generally PERMANENT
SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, THE ROLE OF THE BOARD
OF DIRECTORS IN ENRON'S COLLAPSE, S. REP. NO. 107-70, at 53 (2002) [hereinafter THE ROLE
OF THE BOARD]; 149 CONG. REC. 2823 (2003) (statement of Sen. Levin) [hereinafter Levin
Statement]. At Enron, former CEO Ken Lay had borrowed $81 million from the company
through a series of loans and repaid all but $7 million with stock received from option
exercise. See THE ROLE OF THE BOARD, supra, at 53. Through these loans, Lay effectively sold
$74 million of stock back to the company without disclosing the sales to shareholders, at a
time when Lay was continuing to publicly claim that all was well at Enron. See id. At Tyco,
CEO Dennis Kozlowski and general counsel Mark Belnick received a combined $30.5 million
in loans to purchase real estate, and Kozlowski allegedly used millions in company loans
intended to pay taxes on stock option gains to purchase artwork. See Levin Statement, supra,
at 2824; Mark Maremont et al., Probe of Ex-Tyco Chief Focuses on Improper Use of Company
Funds, WALL ST. J., June 6, 2002, at Al. WorldCom loaned its CEO hundreds of millions of
dollars at low interest rates, and Adelphia loaned over $260 million to members of the
controlling Rigas family. See Levin Statement, supra, at 2825 (citing a proprietary report on
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Kenneth Feinberg managed to curtail and mandate the form of
executive pay at companies participating in the federal bailout.207
But it appears that generally applicable corporate governance
regulation coming out of the financial crisis will be "relatively
modest."208
Of course, there are good reasons for legislators to hesitate before
adopting strongly coercive regulation of corporate governance
matters, even when reform is clearly needed. This is not the place
to explore the problems with such regulation.209 For present
purposes, the point is that, given the track record, it is not surpris-
ing that reform-minded legislators often would abstain from
Adelphia issued by the Corporate Library); Joann S. Lublin & Shawn Young, WorldCom Loan
to CEO of $341 Million Is the Most Generous in Recent Memory, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 2002,
at A3 (reporting that loans to CEO Bernard Ebbers carried interest rates of 2.14 to 2.18
percent). In many cases, the interest and sometimes the principal of executive loans were
forgiven by boards of directors with little apparent deliberation. Levin Statement, supra, at
2825. Moreover, the cost of forbidding such loans might appear to be modest. Unlike executive
pensions, which are ubiquitous, most companies and executives managed just fine without
such loans. Nonetheless, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's ban on loans to corporate executives has
received harsh criticism as heavy-handed congressional interference with private contracting.
See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1538-40 (2005).
207. See, e.g., Deborah Solomon & Dan Fitzpatrick, Pay Slashed at Bailout Firms, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 22, 2009, at Al (detailing limits on cash salary for senior executives and shift of
compensation into "salary stock"); Deborah Solomon & Jessica Holzer, Treasury Restricts Pay
at Four Firms, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2009, at A7 (describing pay limits placed on the next most
highly compensated group of employees).
208. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Corporate Governance Provisions of Dodd-Frank (UCLA
Sch. of Law, Law-Econ. Research Paper No. 10-14,2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
id=1698898; see Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, §§ 951, 952, 954, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (requiring a nonbinding shareholder vote on
executive pay no less frequently than once every three years, directing the SEC to impose
independence requirements on the compensation committees of exchange listed companies,
and directing the SEC to require the national securities exchanges to include erroneous pay
"clawback" provisions as a listing requirement). The Act also addresses compensation
disclosure and compensation committee independence. See id. §§ 952-53.
209. For scholarship that addresses such problems, see Jeffrey N. Gordon, "Say on Pay'"
Cautionary Notes on the U.K. Experience and the Case for Shareholder Opt-In, 46 HARv. J. ON
LEGIS. 323, 325-26 (2009) (criticizing mandatory "say on pay" proposals); David I. Walker, The
Challenge of Improving the Long-Term Focus of Executive Pay, 51 B.C. L. REV. 435, 444-55
(2010) (criticizing proposals aimed at restricting the form and term of executive
compensation).
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proposing bans or inviolable caps and would focus instead on less
coercive tax and nontax disincentives.210
c. Regulatory Illusion of Deduction Disallowance Compared
with Economically Equivalent Nontax Disincentives
Administrative costs aside, tax and nontax penalties can be
designed to be economically equivalent. Consider an SEC penalty
applied to excessive pension payments, however defined, that is
analogous to the penalties applied to automakers that fail to comply
with the CAFE standards discussed in Part I.C. At a 35 percent
marginal tax rate, a 35 percent fine imposed by the SEC on excess
pension payments would be equivalent to denial of a corporate tax
deduction for the same payments.21'
Although economically equivalent, perception of tax and nontax
penalties would differ. 212 There is little doubt that the hypothetical
SEC fine would be viewed as a penalty. Businesses that chose to
ignore the limitation would be required to remit a payment to the
government. Such a scheme should be viewed as less coercive than
a ban or hard cap, but the natural mental framing would be that of
a penalty, and it would be difficult to effectively shift the rhetoric to
revocation of a subsidy.213
Observers, however, tend not to equate disallowed deductions and
direct penalties. As a result of mental framing, the disallowance
likely would be viewed as the elimination of a subsidy.214 Moreover,
this mental framing can be augmented through rhetoric, such as
that employed by former President Clinton in arguing for the
210. Robert Cooter divides disincentives into prices and sanctions. See Robert Cooter,
Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1552 (1984). In his terminology, a sanction is
a disincentive that results in an abrupt jump in cost when a violation occurs, whereas prices
result in smooth, continuous costs. See id. The ban and hard cap discussed in the text above
are examples of sanctions in Cooter's terminology. The tax and nontax disincentives discussed
below would be prices.
211. To be sure, not all corporations pay tax at the 35 percent statutory marginal rate.
Many firms face a lower marginal rate of tax as a result of losses incurred in previous years.
212. See supra Part II.
213. Again consider fines levied for violation of the CAFE standards. See supra Part I.C.
Although economically equivalent to curtailed deductions, they are difficult to frame as the
revocation of a subsidy. See supra Part I.C.
214. See supra note 80 and accompanying text; Part II.C.
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curtailment of the "subsidy" provided by corporate tax deductions
for senior executive pay.215
In this context, whether section 162(m) or a limitation on
deductions for executive pension payments is, in fact, better viewed
as a penalty or as revocation of a subsidy is immaterial. The key is
that tax disallowances tend to be viewed, and can be persuasively
portrayed, as revocation or limitation of subsidies, whereas eco-
nomically equivalent SEC penalties will be viewed as penalties. As
a result, the choice to structure a corporate governance or similar
regulation as a tax disallowance instead of as an economically
equivalent direct penalty should mitigate public and legislative
opposition, both directly and indirectly as a consequence of lessen-
ing public opposition, and facilitate enactment.216
d. Does Framing Impact Structure?
Do these framing advantages help explain the existence of
corporate governance and similar regulation in the tax code? There
is no "smoking gun" committee report establishing the connection,
but common sense suggests that one exists. Within a model of the
political process in which politicians value enactment in addition to,
or in lieu of, efficacy, regulatory illusion should affect the choice of
regulatory method.
Hints of purposeful exploitation of disallowance do exist. It is
noteworthy, for example, that Senator Carl Levin's crusade to force
companies to record stock option compensation as an expense for
financial accounting purposes began with a proposed mandate and
evolved into a proposed tax disallowance.217 A reasonable interpre-
tation would be that the senator first advocated the regulatory
215. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
216. This is not to suggest that disallowance proposals always skate through the legislative
process. Indeed, most disallowance proposals are never enacted. None of the fifteen
disallowance proposals introduced in the 109th Congress has been enacted to date. See supra
note 55 and accompanying text. The argument is simply that regulation structured as
disallowance should face better prospects of enactment than equivalent nontax regulation.
217. See Corporate Executives' Stock Option Accountability Act, S. 259, 103d Cong. (1993)
(mandating expensing of stock options); Ending Excessive Corporate Deductions for Stock
Options Act, S. 1491, 111th Cong. (2009) (barring corporate tax deductions for option
compensation not recognized as an accounting expense).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
approach he felt would be most efficacious and subsequently traded
efficacy for improved prospects of enactment, although, to be sure,
even the disallowance has not been enacted.
Moreover, there is evidence of purposeful exploitation of dis-
allowance in a very similar situation: the 1988 amendments to
section 527. This section addresses the taxation of political organ-
izations and generally exempts these organizations from federal
income tax, although, unlike public charities, political organi-
zations are not eligible to receive tax deductible contributions.218
Dissatisfied with the proliferation of "stealth" political action
committees (PACs) that were not regulated under the Federal
Election Commission Act as a result of the Supreme Court's decision
in Buckley v. Valeo and thus not required to disclose the identity
of their contributors, Congress amended section 527 in 1988 to
tax independent political organizations on undisclosed receipts
and expenditures.219 The amendments were challenged on First
Amendment grounds, but the challenge failed.220
Most relevant for our purposes, however, is the fact that this
regulatory intervention was openly structured as a tax disallowance
to minimize the chances of invalidation. As Senator John McCain
claimed on the Senate floor, "Making these [disclosure] require-
ments a contingency for certain tax credit [sic] status ensures that
these requirements are clearly constitutional. The Constitution
guarantees freedom of speech and association, not an entitlement
to tax-exempt status."221 Although the hurdle in this case-
218. I.R.C. § 527 (2006).
219. See Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 1001(b)(3)(B), 102 Stat. 3342 (1988) (amending I.R.C. §
527). In the early 1970s, Congress established the Federal Election Commission and required
entities organized to influence elections to disclose the identities of their major contributors.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 1 (1976). However, in Buckley, the Supreme Court held that
independent political organizations that refrained from directly advocating the election or
defeat of particular candidates were not subject to regulation by the FEC. See id. at 143;
Gregg D. Polsky & Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Regulating Section 527 Organizations, 73 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 1000, 1004 (2005); Donald B. Tobin, Anonymous Speech and Section 527 of the
Internal Revenue Code, 37 GA. L. REV. 611, 624 (2003). After Buckley, PACs and political
parties faced disclosure mandates, but independent, issue advocacy groups could remain
anonymous. Tobin, supra, at 625 & n.71.
220. Mobile Republican Assemblies v. United States, 353 F.3d 1357, 1361 (11th Cir. 2003).
221. 146 CONG. REC. 12850 (2000) (statement of Sen. McCain); see also Polsky & Charles,
supra note 219, at 1023-24 (arguing that incorporating disclosure regulation within
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constitutional scrutiny-is different than the hurdle faced by the
sponsors of most corporate governance regulation-overcoming
laissez-faire opposition and achieving enactment-the section 527
episode demonstrates the attention paid to structuring and
rhetorical framing. It seems likely that legislative sponsors would
recognize and exploit the framing advantages of tax disallowance in
cases in which no constitutional shadow is cast on direct regulation.
e. Regulatory Illusion Versus Fiscal Illusion
The claims of this Article regarding the relationship between
regulatory illusion and the existence of tax disallowance aimed at
corporate governance and similar matters parallels a similar claim
regarding the relationship between fiscal illusion and the existence
of tax subsidies. The fiscal illusion claim is that the creation of tax
subsidies is an attractive means of advancing popular programs,
such as those encouraging home ownership or employer-provided
health insurance, because tax subsidies appear to limit or reduce
the size of government, where the size of government is naively
judged by the level of taxes and direct spending.2 2 2 From an
allocational and distributional perspective, which is all we should
care about, tax subsidies and direct spending programs may be
section 527 "was, at least in part, designed to bolster the chances that this regulation would
survive a First Amendment challenge").
222. SURREY & McDANIEL, supra note 3, at 104 ("[L]egislators or presidents who do not
want to appear to be 'big spenders' can comfortably approve tax expenditures without
damaging their image of fiscal conservatism."); Shaviro, supra note 28, at 190-91 (explaining
that "big government" is characterized by high taxes and spending, and arguing that political
actors manipulate this label); Toder, supra note 29, at 361 ('Tax incentives serve the needs
of political leaders by enabling them to appear to reduce spending and taxes, while at the
same time pursuing an activist policy that promotes popular programs."). The late David
Bradford provided the classic example of the reach of fiscal illusion in this context by
facetiously proposing that the federal defense budget be replaced with a weapons supply tax
credit. See Bradford, supra note 28, at 432.
The fiscal illusion created by tax subsidies is one example of a larger phenomenon of
obscuring the real cost of publicly provided goods and services in order to assuage public
opposition and facilitate larger government. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN, PUBLIC FINANCE IN
DEMOCRATIC PROCESS: FISCALINSTITUTIONS AND INDIVIDUAL CHOICE 139-43 (1967) (describing
ways in which tax systems can create fiscal illusions); Shaviro, supra note 189, at 59
(discussing means by which government can "impos(e] costs indirectly and otherwise
camouflag[e] them in order to avoid public scrutiny").
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identical, but formally, tax subsidies reduce taxes and add nothing
to direct expenditures.22 3 The "small government" preferring public
is susceptible to this fiscal illusion, and, as a result, the demand and
provision of public goods and services depends on how they are
financed.224
The fiscal illusion of tax subsidies is, of course, the result of a
tendency to frame tax cuts and direct spending differently.22 5 Daniel
Shaviro has attributed the difference in public perception "to the
fact that people are simply more willing to allow others to take
advantage of tax breaks than they are to give them payouts,"226 and
Edward Zelinsky has shown that individuals react differently to
paying "volunteer" firefighters directly as compared with providing
firefighters with economically equivalent property tax exemp-
tions.227
My sense is that framing and illusion are equally important for
the enactment of tax disincentives, but for very different reasons.
Disallowances of otherwise ordinary and necessary business
expense deductions suffer in terms of fiscal illusion. They appear to
raise taxes and they provide no direct revenue. But surely placing
disincentives in the Code has little to do with revenue. If the
disincentives are successful in altering behavior, there will be no
revenue effects at all, and if unsuccessful, wouldn't Congress have
preferred to more directly and visibly raise revenue from wrongdo-
ers? Rather, the benefit of placing disincentives in the Code is the
ability to shift the rhetoric from "penalty" to "no subsidy," which
defuses critics of regulatory intervention.
223. Shaviro, supra note 28, at 191.
224. Shaviro, supra note 189, at 59.
225. Edward A. Zelinsky, Do Tax Expenditures Create Framing Effects? Volunteer
Firefighters, Property Tax Exemptions, and the Paradox of Tax Expenditure Analysis, 24 VA.
TAX REv. 797, 800 (2005).
226. Shaviro, supra note 189, at 63. Shaviro also suggests that the difference follows from
a failure to understand that tax subsidies and direct spending are "functionally equivalent."
Id. at 62.
227. Zelinsky, supra note 225, at 797 (providing survey evidence suggesting that direct
payments were more likely to be viewed as vitiating volunteer status than economically
equivalent tax exemptions, and suggesting that framing effects help explain the persistence
of tax expenditures despite the promulgation of tax expenditure budgets); see also ARNOLD,
supra note 198, at 200 (arguing that tax preferences have a "dual advantage" over direct
spending of being equally salient to beneficiaries, but largely invisible otherwise).
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To be sure, merely placing a disincentive in the Code is not
sufficient to create the appearance of revoking a subsidy. It would
be no easier to frame an excise tax imposed on excessive executive
pensions as the revocation of a subsidy than it would be to frame an
SEC fine as removing a subsidy. The key to subsidy framing, in this
context at least, is the existence of an associated deduction that can
be curtailed on the basis of noncompliant behavior.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF MENTAL AND RHETORICAL FRAMING OF
DEDUCTION AS SUBSIDY
Mental framing is an unavoidable aspect of human cognition.
However, baselines can change over time as we acquire experience
and information. Self-serving rhetorical framing is inevitable in
open democratic debate, but to some extent the force of rhetoric may
be tempered through reflection and analysis. Structuring business
regulation as tax disallowance leads to predictable mental framing
biases and facilitates rhetorical framing that likely produces more
regulation than we would otherwise observe. This Part briefly
explores these implications.
A. Mental Framing
Mental baselines are necessary and useful tools for categorizing
information and solving problems. However, this Article has argued
that there is a tendency among judges, policymakers, and the public
towards overbroad framing of business deductions as subsidies.228
Moreover, repeated use of explicit subsidy rhetoric by policymakers
may reinforce the false perception both inside and outside Washing-
ton that all business tax deductions, exemptions, and credits are
subsidies.229
228. See supra Part III.
229. Murray Edelman has described how verbal cues become laden with meaning over time
and how political rhetoric "becomes a sequence of Pavlovian cues rather than an instrument
for reasoning and analysis if situation and appropriate cue occur together." EDELMAN, supra
note 189, at 116. His example from the 1960s is the reaction of physicians to the phrase
"compulsory health insurance," but he could as easily have been talking about the reaction
of voters to "subsidies" attributed to various tax deductions. See id.
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Although mental framing is to some extent unavoidable, judges
and policymakers should be alert to the tendency to conceptualize
business deductions as subsidies and resist the tendency to let the
appearance of subsidy alone influence outcomes. They should ques-
tion the subsidy characterization and its significance. Perhaps the
underlying deduction represents an actual subsidy; perhaps it does
not. One way policymakers may be able to overcome their subcon-
scious mental framing of deduction as subsidy is by consciously
considering not just the ex post effect of deduction or disallowance,
but the entire transaction, including the tax treatment of any
benefit arising from the disfavored behavior. Doing so may reveal
that business and nonbusiness taxpayers are not similarly situated,
and that deduction is not necessarily equivalent to subsidy.
More importantly, judges and policymakers should ask whether
the subsidy characterization matters at all. Perhaps subsidy char-
acterization is irrelevant, and the appropriate question is simply
whether the underlying policy issue at stake is advanced or
hindered by the proposed disallowance. Policymakers considering
disallowance on public policy grounds should ask whether the
optimal policy response is to squelch the disfavored behavior
entirely or to cause participants to internalize the full social cost.
They should also ask whether deduction really does undermine the
policy or simply maintains, on an after-tax basis, the balance of
deterrence, error costs, and the like, that was desired on a pre-tax
basis. Policymakers faced with corporate governance and similar
regulation proposed as disallowance should consider whether they
would support equivalent nontax regulation. This is not to suggest
that policymakers should ignore administrative or other differences
between tax and nontax regulation, but a red light should go off if
a policymaker who supports a disallowance proposal would strongly
resist equivalent nontax regulation.
B. Rhetorical Framing
Self-serving and even disingenuous characterization of business
deductions as subsidies by policymakers seeking a legislative result
is regrettable, perhaps, but certainly unavoidable. Some business
deductions do represent subsidies within our net income tax system;
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others are debatable.230 Moreover, even if we could reach consensus
on the proper characterization of each deduction, it is inconceivable
that such rhetoric could or would be restricted in open, democratic
debate.
Nonetheless, disingenuous subsidy rhetoric is particularly trou-
bling because there may be a negative externality. The rhetoric may
reinforce the already overbroad view amongst the public, jurists,
and policymakers that business deductions are subsidies.2 ' In other
words, the rhetoric is effective both in the current debate and in
shaping perception over time. There is, however, no apparent supply
side solution to this problem.
C. Structural Choice or Framing
Although overbroad mental framing of business deduction as
subsidy and self-serving rhetoric equating deduction with subsidy
are inevitable and largely unavoidable, the choice to structure
business regulation as a disallowance is not. This Article has argued
that business deductions are particularly susceptible to mental
framing as subsidy and that rhetoric equating deduction with sub-
sidy can be a powerful tool in achieving enactment of disallowances.
Of course, disallowance proposals are not always successful. They
may succeed only rarely. But if the foregoing analysis is correct, an
implication of the framing effects is that there will be more business
regulation than there would be if the tax code were not a viable
regulatory venue.
Moreover, experience suggests that such regulation can be inef-
fective and even counterproductive. Consider corporate governance
regulation enacted in the form of disallowed deductions, such as
section 162(m), which caps the deductibility of non-performance-
230. See supra Part II.A.2.
231. For example, in July 2010, BP announced its intention to deduct damage payments
and other costs associated with the Gulf of Mexico oil spill. President Obama's press secretary
called on the company to voluntarily forgo the deduction which could reduce its taxes by up
to $10 billion. As tax commentator Lee Sheppard noted, several companies have voluntarily
forgone deductions in the face of political pressure. She went on to note, consistent with the
idea expressed in this Article, that "[d]oing so makes for a better headline, but it also
convinces the populace that all deductions are tax preferences." Lee A. Sheppard, Cash on the
Barrelhead: BP and Taxes, TAx NOTES, Aug. 9, 2010, at 571.
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212based senior executive pay,22 and section 280G, which limits the
deductibility of excessive severance payments.233 These are "remark-
ably crude policy instruments"234 that impose a one-size-fits-all-
offenses penalty on a range of disfavored behaviors engaged in by
particular firms, and that from firm to firm impose varying disin-
centives depending on effective marginal tax rates.
The bluntness of the tax instrument, combined with a loss of
expertise that occurs when regulation that would logically be
administered by the SEC is administered by the Treasury instead,235
may help explain why tax-based corporate governance regulation
has met with such little success and, indeed, may have been
counterproductive. Of course, if one believes that corporate gover-
nance legislation is largely symbolic, one would not be surprised to
learn that sections 162(m) and 280G have failed to reduce the value
or improve the structure of executive pay arrangements. But the
situation is worse than that. In all likelihood, these provisions have
skewed compensation away from the efficient mix of stock, options,
and cash; provided camouflage for boosting executive pay; and
shifted costs of noncompliance onto shareholders.236
Section 162(m) is widely believed to have contributed to the
explosion in stock option compensation in the 1990s. 237 The rule
provided a reason or pretext for firms to replace salary with options,
and given the riskiness of options, firms could justify replacing a
dollar of salary with much more than a dollar of option compensa-
232. I.R.C. § 162(m) (2006).
233. Id. § 280G.
234. See Zolt, supra note 4, at 344.
235. See Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 40, at 958-59.
236. See, e.g., Gregg D. Polsky, Controlling Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code,
64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877, 925-26 (2007) (arguing that section 162(m) should not have been
expected to benefit shareholders under either of the prevailing theories of the executive
compensation setting process and concluding that the empirical evidence supports the view
that it was not); James R. Repetti, The Misuse of Tax Incentives To Align Management-
Shareholder Interests, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 697, 699 (1997) (arguing that tax incentives aimed
at corporate governance are ineffective because "they fail to address the complexities of
stockholder-management relations").
237. See Polsky, supra note 236, at 906 (documenting the widespread belief among
informed observers that section 162(m) contributed to the options explosion, but also noting
the lack of clear-cut empirical evidence).
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tion.238 Moreover, given the complexity of options, executive pay
became much less transparent, which may have facilitated increases
in total compensation.' Add in the 1990s bull market and the
result was a tremendous transfer of wealth from stockholders to
executives.24 Today, of course, option compensation is under attack
in Washington as having encouraged excess risk-taking that
contributed to the recent financial meltdown (an ironic situation,
given the history),24' and firms are responding by switching away
from options to restricted stock and short-term incentives.242
Section 280G has not had such disastrous social consequences,
but it has been no more successful. Initially, some firms responded
by capping golden parachute severance payments at a level that
would ensure full deductibility at the corporate level and avoid
excise taxes for executives.243 As time went on, however, more and
more firms exceeded the caps and adopted "gross up" policies that
caused shareholders to bear the cost of both the foregone tax
deduction and the executive's excise tax.244
Would direct regulation have been more successful? It is hard to
say. The agency problems are substantial and undermine attempts
238. See Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, The Taxation of Executive Compensation, in
14 TAX POLICY AND THE EcoNoviY 1, 36 (James M. Poterba ed., 2000) (finding that salary
reductions post-1993 were more than offset by additional stock option grants).
239. Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of
Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 751, 756, 817 (2002) (proposing a managerial
power theory of the executive pay setting process in which compensation opacity minimizes
outrage and facilitates increased pay).
240. See Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay, 21 OXFORD REV.
ECON. POL'Y 283, 302 (2005) (finding an increase in senior executive pay between 1993 and
2003 at U.S. firms that far exceeded the growth that could be explained by increases in stock
prices alone, and finding that the aggregate compensation of the top five executives of these
firms from 2001 to 2003 exceeded 10 percent of aggregate corporate earnings).
241. See Walker, supra note 209, at 444 (explaining that section 162(m) encouraged firms
to compensate executives with stock options).
242. See JAMES F. REDA & Assocs., EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION TRENDS FOR 2009:
BALANCING RISK, PERFORMANCE AND PAY (2009), available at http://www.cii.org/
resourcesKeyGovernancelssuesExecutiveCompensation (reviewing 2009 proxy statements of
200 large companies).
243. See Bruce A. Wolk, The Golden Parachute Provisions: Time for Repeal?. 21 VA. TAX
REV. 125, 136 (2001).
244. See id. at 181 (discussing the gross up provisions used to reallocate the tax burden of
sections 280G and 4999 from company executives to shareholders).
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to control executive pay through substantive regulation.245 However,
in these cases, shareholders, and indeed society, may have been
better off if Congress had not regulated at all, instead of targeting
these deductions. In these cases, subsidy framing may have made
it too easy to enact legislation that would have better lain dormant.
To be sure, it is also possible that alternative nontax corporate
governance legislation might have been worse. Suppose there was
no corporate income tax or similar tax that could serve as the basis
for tax penalties. A Congress that was determined to regulate
executive pay might have devised penalties that were equivalent
economically to sections 162(m) and 280G. On the other hand,
nontax intervention might have taken the form of a ban or cap on
non-performance-based pay or golden parachute payments along the
lines of the Sarbanes-Oxley ban on executive loans. If enacted,
legislation of this nature might have had greater impact than
sections 162(m) and 280G, but also could have created much greater
inefficiencies. 246 However, the fact that alternative regulation
possibly could have been worse does not justify the ineffective and
counterproductive business regulation that is found in the tax code
today.
CONCLUSION
Framing is an unavoidable aspect of human cognition. Everyone
is aware that survey responses are affected by how questions are
framed. Tax deductions, however, seem particularly susceptible to
mental and rhetorical framing as subsidy. This Article has argued
245. See Walker, supra note 209, at 445-46.
246. Suppose, for example, that as a result of risk aversion or other factors, it would be
efficient for a firm to provide non-performance-based pay to an executive in excess of the $1
million "cap" provided under section 162(m). I.R.C. § 162(m) (2006). The cost to shareholders
of managers electing to ignore the current deduction disallowance is simply the forgone tax
benefit. So, for example, if the firm continued to provide $2 million of non-performance-based
pay to an executive after the enactment of section 162(m), instead of restructuring the pay as
$1 million non-performance- and $1 million performance-based pay, it would incur a cost of
$350,000 at a 35 percent tax rate. This alternative would not exist under a system that placed
a hard cap of $1 million on non-performance-based pay. Firms would be strictly constrained
in their compensation decisions no matter how inefficient, and social welfare could well be
reduced by a regulatory approach that imposed greater inefficiencies on firms, particularly
if the regulation was largely symbolic in the first place.
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that mental framing of deduction as subsidy contributed to disallow-
ance of various business deductions on "public policy" grounds in the
courts and to the codification of these disallowances by Congress. It
has also suggested that mental and rhetorical framing contributed
to the choice to structure various corporate governance measures as
tax disallowances and to the ultimate enactment of these measures.
The normative implications of framing are troubling and provide
another reason to be skeptical of corporate governance and similar
business regulation incorporated in the tax code.
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APPENDIX
Student Attitude Surveys-Executive Pensions
Each of approximately 250 first-year law students at Boston
University received 1 of 3 versions of a survey question. 241
responses were received. Summary statistics and the 3 versions of
the survey question follow:
Regulatory N Mean Standard 2 sample t tests
Approach Support Deviation One-tail
Rating P value
Direct Penalty 83 4.6 2.8
.0001
Deduction
Curtailment 82 6.2 2.7
(subsidy framing)
.0103
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[Version #1: Direct Penalty]
Student Attitude Survey-Executive Pensions
This ANONYMOUS survey is being administered by Professor [ ] and
will provide data for his research. Your participation is entirely
VOLUNTARY. There will be no repercussions if you decide not to
participate. If you have any questions about this survey or the research,
you may contact Professor[ ]at[], at [ ], or by stopping by his office.
Thank you for your assistance.
Please consider the following:
Many observers feel that corporate executive retirement packages
have grown too large. At the same time that businesses have been
cutting back on pensions offered to rank and file employees,
pensions received by chief executive officers (CEOs) and other
corporate executives have mushroomed. A recent study of CEOs
nearing retirement found that, on average, the executives were
promised pension payments in excess of $1.5 million/year, with
some executives being promised over $5 million/year.* While some
observers consider these large pensions to be unfair and a matter of
public concern, others argue that as long as pension payments are
fully disclosed to investors, this private market should be allowed
to operate freely without government interference.
Governments employ various tools to discourage behavior
considered socially undesirable or to correct for market failure,
including penalties, user fees, and excise taxes. Suppose Congress
were to consider imposing penalties on executive pension payments
beyond a certain level. For example, Congress might allow pension
payments of up to $1 million/year for each former executive without
penalty. However, pension payments in excess of this amount would
result in a penalty of, say, 35 percent of the excess payment. The
penalty would be paid by the corporation that made the excess
pension payment. Thus, for example, if Acme Corp. paid its former
* See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Executive Pensions, 30 J. CORP. L.
823, 843 (2005).
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CEO a pension of $3 million in 2008, the penalty would be 35
percent of the excess $2 million, or $700,000.
Would you be in favor of Congress imposing a penalty on excess
pension payments as described above? Please rate your view on a
scale of 1 (strongly object to imposing a penalty on excess executive
pensions) to 10 (strongly support imposing a penalty) and enter the
figure in the box below.
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[Version #2: Deduction Curtailment, Neutral Framing]
Student Attitude Survey-Executive Pensions
This ANONYMOUS survey is being administered by Professor [ I and
will provide data for his research. Your participation is entirely
vOLUNTARY. There will be no repercussions if you decide not to
participate. If you have any questions about this survey or the research,
you may contact Professor[ ]at[], at [ ], or by stopping by his office
Thank you for your assistance.
Please consider the following:
Many observers feel that corporate executive retirement packages
have grown too large. At the same time that businesses have been
cutting back on pensions offered to rank and file employees,
pensions received by chief executive officers (CEOs) and other
corporate executives have mushroomed. A recent study of CEOs
nearing retirement found that, on average, the executives were
promised pension payments in excess of $1.5 million/year, with
some executives being promised over $5 million/year.* While some
observers consider these large pensions to be unfair and a matter of
public concern, others argue that as long as pension payments are
fully disclosed to investors, this private market should be allowed
to operate freely without government interference.
Governments employ various tools to discourage behavior
considered socially undesirable or to correct for market failure,
including taxation. In calculating their taxable income, corporations
currently are entitled to deduct amounts paid out to their executives
as pensions, which, for most companies, reduces the effective cost of
providing pensions by about 35 percent. Suppose Congress were to
consider limiting the deductibility of executive pensions payments.
Congress might allow a deduction for the first $1 million/year paid
out to each former executive as a pension, but disallow deductions
for pension payments in excess of this amount. For example, if Acme
Corp. paid its former CEO a pension of $3 million in 2008, the first
* See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Executive Pensions, 30 J. CORP. L.
823, 843 (2005).
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$1 million would be deductible, but the next $2 million would not be.
In this case, the change in law would increase the effective cost to
Acme of providing a $3 million pension by $700,000.
Would you be in favor of Congress limiting the deductibility of
pension payments as described above? Please rate your view on a
scale of 1 (strongly object to limiting deductibility of executive
pensions) to 10 (strongly support limiting deductibility) and enter
the figure in the box below.
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[Version #3: Deduction Curtailment, Subsidy Framing]
Student Attitude Survey-Executive Pensions
This ANONYMOUS survey is being administered by Professor [ I and
will provide data for his research. Your participation is entirely
VOLUNTARY. There will be no repercussions if you decide not to
participate. If you have any questions about this survey or the research,
you may contact Professor[ ]at[ ], at [ ], or by stopping by his office
Thank you for your assistance.
Please consider the following:
Many observers feel that corporate executive retirement packages
have grown too large. At the same time that businesses have been
cutting back on pensions offered to rank and file employees,
pensions received by chief executive officers (CEOs) and other
corporate executives have mushroomed. A recent study of CEOs
nearing retirement found that, on average, the executives were
promised pension payments in excess of $1.5 million/year, with
some executives being promised over $5 million/year.* While some
observers consider these large pensions to be unfair and a matter of
public concern, others argue that as long as pension payments are
fully disclosed to investors, this private market should be allowed
to operate freely without government interference.
In calculating their taxable income, corporations currently are
entitled to deduct amounts paid out to their executives as pensions,
which, for most companies, reduces the effective cost of providing
pensions by about 35 percent. The deduction, in effect, results in a
subsidy by U.S. taxpayers. Suppose Congress were to consider
limiting the deductibility of executive pensions payments. Congress
might allow a deduction for the first $1 million/year paid out to each
former executive as a pension, but disallow deductions for pension
payments in excess of this amount. For example, if Acme Corp. paid
its former CEO a pension of $3 million in 2008, the first $1 million
would be deductible, but the next $2 million would not be. Eliminat-
* See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Executive Pensions, 30 J. CORP. L.
823, 843 (2005).
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ing the tax subsidy on $2 million of pension payments would save
taxpayers about $700,000, compared with current law.
Would you be in favor of Congress limiting the deductibility of
pension payments as described above? Please rate your view on a
scale of 1 (strongly object to limiting deductibility of executive
pensions) to 10 (strongly support limiting deductibility) and enter
the figure in the box below.
